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IMPEACHMENT AS JUDICIAL SELECTION?
Tuan Samahon*
Ideological judicial selection encompasses more than the affirmative nominating,
confirming, and appointing of judges who pre-commit to particular legal interpretations
and constructions of constitutional text.  It may also include deselection by way of im-
peachment and removal (or at least its threat) of judges subscribing to interpretations
and constructions of the Constitution that one disapproves.  This negative tactic may
be particularly effective when deployed against judges on closely divided collegial
courts, such as the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. courts of appeals, where per-
sonnel determine voting majorities and, in turn, majorities determine case outcomes.
The Pickering-Chase, Fortas-Douglas, and Christian Coalition impeachments and
threats of impeachment illustrate that the use or threat of this tactic is more common
than might be supposed.  Indeed, recent calls for the removal of Circuit Judge Jay
Bybee demonstrate the continuing allure of impeachment as judicial selection.
This Article examines the phenomenon of impeachment as judicial selection
through Professors Tushnet’s and Balkin’s framework of “constitutional hardball.”  In
the case of impeachment as judicial selection, Congress plays constitutional hardball
by claiming that it is an appropriate tool for political control and a fraternal twin to the
modern appointments process.  This Article details prior episodes of impeachment as
judicial selection.  It explains why the idea of impeachment as an ex post selection
tool proves so tempting.  It then considers those legal arguments that justify and
contest the claims of this variety of constitutional hardball.  Further, the Article
makes the case that, contrary to conventional wisdom, constitutional and political
developments make impeachment a closer alternative to transformative, affirmative
selection than in the past.  This relative feasibility heightens the fool’s gold allure
of impeachment as judicial selection.  Actually impeaching for judicial selection, how-
ever, would yield results that many would consider as untoward and unacceptably
intruding on judicial independence and the rule of law.  This Article briefly considers
those significant costs.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider the two following scenarios.  In the first, a President is bent on reshaping
the judiciary during a period of divided government.1  The President campaigned on
the promise of remaking the Supreme Court by appointing “strict constructionists.”
The administration hoped to appoint a new Justice who would not obligate law
enforcement to comply with new procedural rights and safeguards, but no vacancy is
forthcoming.  The President suspects that the incumbents are timing their resignations
to benefit the opposition political party.  Even if there were a vacancy to fill, no trans-
formative nomination would survive the Senate absent a filibuster-proof supermajority.
The modern era of divided government almost guarantees confirmation controversy.
In the second scenario, a House Representative has grown frustrated with the
Court’s decisions striking down federal legislation.  When the prior administration’s
party controlled the Senate, it packed the Court with jurists deaf to the contemporary
commands of the “Living Constitution.”2  The Court’s five-four majorities on sev-
eral federalism cases reflected cramped interpretations of national power.  Now this
House Representative’s party controls both chambers of Congress.  No vacancy,
however, is forthcoming.  Even were there one, the Congressman would have no
say.  The Constitution excludes the House from formally participating in the judicial
appointments process.  The Congressman chafes at the votes his moderate Senate
colleagues have cast to confirm judges and Justices who have proven, in retrospect,
to be “mistakes.”
What is a President or a legislator to do if appointment is unavailable to change
the judiciary’s composition?
There may be another instrument available to secure the ends of judicial selection:
the use of impeachment as a tool of judicial selection.  Typically, “judicial selection”
is used interchangeably with “appointments process.”  The President nominates; the
Senate confirms (or not); and the President appoints.3  Affirmative appointments,
however, are only one side of the judicial selection coin.  Although the elected
branches act as if they are writing with political indelible ink when they nominate,
confirm, and appoint, Article III judges hold their offices during “good Behaviour,”4
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5 Impeachment for treason, bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors on the one
hand along with failure to abide by the “good behaviour” condition on the other, are quite
arguably distinct and unrelated grounds upon which an Article III judge may be removed from
office. Compare id. at art. II, § 4, with id. at art. III, § 1. For an elaboration of this argument,
see generally Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116
YALE L.J. 72 (2006) (arguing that the “good behaviour” clause permits federal judges to
remove other federal judges pursuant to writ of scire facias). Their argument advances an
interpretation of good behavior previously advocated during the Nixon administration by none
other than William Rehnquist, then-Assistant Attorney General for the Department of Justice’s
Office of Legal Counsel. See The Independence of Federal Judges: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 330–51
(1971) (statement of William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States). Except
where otherwise noted, this Article adopts, for simplicity’s sake, the conventional view that
impeachment is the exclusive means by which an Article III judge may be removed from
office. The availability of a writ of scire facias to remove incumbent judges would increase
the opportunities to “deselect” judges by other means. For a critique of the Prakash-Smith
thesis, see James E. Pfander, Removing Federal Judges, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227, 1228
(2007) (rejecting the view that “good behavior” tenure allows federal judges to be removed
by any mechanism other than that of impeachment and conviction).
6 See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523 (2004).
a term only interpretively glossed as “for life.” But it is not for life if the judge
misbehaves—or at least opponents can make a plausible argument to that effect—
and Congress removes the jurist, or at least threatens to remove the judge.5  In such
a case “judicial selection” might encompass the tactical use of impeachment to de-
select judges.  Alternatively, proponents of using impeachment as a tool of judicial
selection might drop the pretext of “misbehavior” when invoking it (or at least broadly
expand the traditional understanding of what constitutes actionable misbehavior).
Such advocates might reconceptualize impeachment, in plain view, as a tool for
judicial selection.
Why might impeachment be used in this way?  Both appointment and impeach-
ment may be used to affect membership on a collegial court.  When appointment is
unavailable, impeachment may be resorted to as a complementary tactic to secure a
change in court personnel.  Not only does impeachment rid one of a disfavored adju-
dicator, it creates room for the appointment of a favored one.  This Article suggests
that, as a judicial selection tool, impeachment as judicial selection boasts several im-
portant advantages over appointment and that, contrary to what might be supposed,
impeachment is becoming a closer alternative to appointment.
This Article develops its argument in five parts.  In Part I, this Article frames
the phenomenon of impeachment as judicial selection as a tactic of constitutional
hardball, i.e., the framework suggested by Professor Mark Tushnet for understand-
ing how parties or movements secure rapid change between constitutional orders.6
Part I also discusses several of the prominent instances of resort to this tactic, includ-
ing the Jeffersonian, Nixonian, and Christian Coalition impeachments or threats of
impeachment.  It also considers the recent Democratic calls to impeach Circuit Judge
Jay Bybee as an instance of the impeachment as judicial selection phenomenon.
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7 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
Part II explains the allure of impeachment as judicial selection.  If ideological
judicial selection really is one’s object, impeachment may be a superior tool for that
purpose.  Impeachment, as an ex post confirmation tool, permits better information
about jurists and thereby obviates concerns about stealth nominees and jurisprudential
drift.  Moreover, whereas appointment often results in only status quo replacement due
to strategic retirement, impeachment may be used to make transformative appoint-
ments to the vacated judicial office.  Further, impeachment also permits Congress, and
not the President, to initiate the selection process.
During constitutional hardball, parties make competing legal claims about what
the Constitution means or does not mean.  Part III examines what textual, structural,
historical, and purpose-based arguments might be advanced to defend or to contest
ideological selection.  It illustrates that colorable, nonfrivolous arguments are avail-
able to support the parties’ constitutional hardball.  In particular, Part III observes that
the argumentative strategies used to justify ideological appointment parallel those
used to justify impeachment as judicial selection and that both rely on the paramount
functional need to check the federal judiciary.
Part IV explains why the risk of impeachment as judicial selection has grown.
Impeachment and appointment have become closer mechanisms for judicial selection
because legal and political developments have leveled the barriers to impeachment and
elevated the barriers to appointment.  First, direct election of senators has weakened the
Senate’s cooling function by making both congressional chambers directly elected
and thereby facilitating partisan unity.  The era of inter-branch divided government has
accompanied this development, thereby making transformative appointment more
difficult than in the past.  Second, the filibuster and senatorial courtesy have made
transformative judicial appointments more difficult to obtain.  At the same time, the
silent operation of impeachment, including in terrorem resignation and discipline, may
obviate the need to obtain the supermajority necessary to impeach.  Third, the Court’s
rationale in Walter Nixon v. United States7 concerning the nonjusticiability of impeach-
ment proceedings has effectively broadened the traditionally limited grounds for invok-
ing impeachment.  Finally, appointment has become more procedurally inefficient
over time as impeachment procedure has simultaneously become more streamlined.
Part V considers the cost of using impeachment as a tool of judicial selection,
especially its effect on the decisional independence of the Article III judiciary and on
the rule of law.  Part V concludes by suggesting several areas for possible reform
that might avoid impeachment as judicial selection, or at least make its invocation
less appealing.
I. THE PHENOMENON OF IMPEACHMENT AS JUDICIAL SELECTION
The phenomenon of impeachment as judicial selection occurs during the course of
American constitutional history in sporadic episodes.  Part I situates this phenomenon
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8 See Tushnet, supra note 6, at 523.
9 Id.
10 Id. Professor Jack Balkin offers several friendly amendments to Tushnet. Among others,
he suggests that there may not be a settled, pre-constitutional understanding on the matter at
all. Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Hardball and Constitutional Crises, 26 QUINNIPIAC L.
REV. 579, 585 (2008). Partisans may not conceive of their positions as a change from prior
practice, but a “best interpretation of existing conventions with respect to a question that has
never been clearly decided.” Id. Further, he suggests that constitutional hardball may be either
a tactic or a goal, or both. Id. at 581–82.
11 Tushnet, supra note 6, at 533.
12 Balkin, supra note 10, at 584.
13 Tushnet, supra note 6, at 530.
14 See id. at 545.
15 See id. at 523.
16 Balkin, supra note 10, at 596.
as a species of “constitutional hardball” and details several instances where parties
resorted to the tactic in order to secure rapid change between constitutional orders.
A. Impeachment as Constitutional Hardball
1. The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Hardball
Professor Mark Tushnet has proposed the phenomenon of “constitutional hard-
ball” to explain how political parties and movements secure rapid change between
constitutional orders without resort to formal amendment.8  Constitutional hardball
occurs when competing arguments, within the bounds of existing constitutional norms,
are made about what the Constitution permits.9  Executive or legislative tactics are
proposed, or justified, that are in “tension with existing pre-constitutional understand-
ings.”10  The new proposal about what the Constitution permits would “displace
settled processes with ones that would make it easier” for partisans or movements
“to put in place the new institutional arrangements they favor,”11 or possibly as a by-
product, “to establish that the Constitution means one thing rather than another.”12
The new arrangements would make it easier for a dominant power, for example, to
become further entrenched, or for a minor power to secure an upper hand.13  Consti-
tutional hardball need not actually attain its end to be successful.  Short of outright
victory, one team might secure a “brushback,” i.e., a constitutional political pitch that
intimidates the batter and thereby secures an advantage.14  Tushnet suggests the stakes
are high in hardball, separating the phenomenon from ordinary constitutional politics.15
Constitutional hardball may not always occur in plain view.  Parties may engage
in a game of “stealth constitutional hardball” where “practices of entrenchment . . .
fly below the radar of public recognition.”16  The stealthiness of such practices may
result from partisans employing public justificatory arguments that disguise novel
claims in terms familiar to the existing constitutional order.  In contrast, plain view
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17 Tushnet, supra note 6, at 544–45.
18 See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550–51 (1935)
(unanimously reversing criminal convictions under provisions of “Poultry Code” of National
Industrial Recovery Act, because they impermissibly delegated legislative power and exceeded
congressional power to regulate interstate commerce).
19 The Judiciary Reorganization Bill of 1937 would have authorized a new judgeship on the
Supreme Court, and every other federal court, for every judge who attained the age of seventy
and had neither resigned nor retired within six months of that date. 81 CONG. REC. 880 (1937).
20 CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR
CONTROL OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 66–67 (2006). Since 1869, the authorized number
of seats on the Court had been nine. 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (providing for eight associate Justices
and one Chief Justice); see also John V. Orth, How Many Judges Does it Take to Make a
Supreme Court?, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 681, 682 (2002).
21 See MARIAN C. MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL
WAR: THE COURT-PACKING CRISIS OF 1937, at 283–84 (2002).
22 See Tushnet, supra note 6, at 544.
23 MCKENNA, supra note 21, at 519–21. Although the bill was never enacted, the concept
of court packing remains with us. See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R. Hensley,
Unfulfilled Aspirations: The Court-Packing Efforts of Presidents Reagan and Bush, 57 ALB.
L. REV. 1111 (1994) (describing two presidential campaigns to appoint conservative federal
judges).
hardball engages in public justificatory argument that does not attempt to conform
to the existing constitutional order’s settled understandings and assumptions.  The
stealthy version of constitutional hardball might prove more effective than its plain
view alternative, in part, because of its familiarity and/or because of the public’s
unawareness of motivations underlying the claims.
For example, Tushnet proposes President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s court-
packing plan as an episode of constitutional hardball.17  The traditional story is that a
libertarian Supreme Court had repeatedly thwarted FDR’s New Deal programs by strik-
ing down key legislation as unconstitutional.18  FDR capitalized on the Constitution’s
silence about the Court’s size when he proposed Congress legislatively increase the
number of authorized seats.19  There was precedent for so doing.  Prior to 1869, the
Court had been both larger and smaller than the familiar nine-Justice Court.20  FDR’s
court-packing plan initially was touted as an effort to aid a geriatric Court that, in
light of its aging jurists and a supposedly crushing caseload, required additional man-
power.21  This stealthy constitutional hardball—admittedly ill disguised—offered a
public justification that appeared to concern itself only with the efficient administration
of justice.  In reality, FDR would appoint new Justices to these newly authorized
seats.  In turn, these additional Justices would serve to dilute the voting power of the
Court incumbents, and FDR’s New Deal programs would be sustained.22
The Court eventually forced the stealth constitutional hardball into plain view
by rejecting the claim that its caseload was particularly burdensome.  Perhaps as a re-
sult of that fact, the Senate rejected the plan.23  But although the inning was lost, the
game was won when Justice Owen Roberts, who formerly voted with the anti-New
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24 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (5-4 decision)
(upholding state minimum wage regulation against a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process challenge), overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); see also
GEYH, supra note 20, at 79–80.
25 See GEYH, supra note 20, at 80; Tushnet, supra note 6, at 545. For a persuasive explana-
tion of why this traditional account is inaccurate, see G. Edward White, Constitutional Change
and the New Deal: The Internalist/Externalist Debate, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 1094 (2005)
(questioning externalist “switch in time” explanation as a post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy).
26 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, 153 n.4 (1938)
(presuming the constitutionality of economic regulation).
27 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (permitting congressional
power to regulate interstate commerce to reach wholly intrastate grain production, not for sale
in commerce, that taken in aggregate, would affect interstate commerce).
Deal majority, began to vote to uphold the New Deal.24  His changed voting behavior,
which was secured by a brushback and obviated the need for any court-packing plan,
has been traditionally characterized as “the switch in time that saved nine.”25  The
result ushered in a new constitutional order that presumed the constitutional validity
of federal economic regulation26 and greatly diminished the restraining capacity of
structural constitutional law.27  Thus, Roosevelt obtained rapid constitutional change
through his (unsuccessful) court-packing plan and thereby entrenched his parties’
views about government for decades to come.
2. The Tactic of Impeachment as Judicial Selection
Constitutional hardball has instantiations beyond court-packing, including the
related tactic of “court-depacking,” or what this Article terms “impeachment as judi-
cial selection.”  That tactic seeks a similar end—i.e., a court composed of like-minded
jurists—but seeks to do so through a mechanism of deselection.  It recognizes that
ideological “judicial selection” encompasses more than the affirmative nominating,
confirming, and appointing of judges who pre-commit to particular legal interpreta-
tions and constructions of constitutional text.  It also includes deselection, by way of
impeachment and removal (or at least their threat), of those judges subscribing to
constitutional interpretations and constructions with which one disapproves.  This
negative strategy may prove particularly effective when deployed against judges on
closely divided collegial courts who were appointed by a President of an opposing
political party.  Such courts might include the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. courts
of appeals.  The hyperrealist jurisprudential premise of this approach is that the
identity of judicial personnel determines voting majorities and, in turn, majorities
determine case outcomes.
Both the stealthy and plain view versions of this constitutional hardball tactic
require impeachment’s machinery to remove an Article III judge.  The stealthy version
of this hardball, while harboring ideological, political, or partisan motivations, must
make its claim in terms traditionally recognized as impeachable offenses.  Because
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28 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
29 Overcriminalization has increased the possibility of charging a foot fault. The phe-
nomenon of overcriminalization has been described by a number of commentators. See, e.g.,
Alex Kozinski & Misha Tseytlin, You’re (Probably) a Federal Criminal, in IN THE NAME OF
JUSTICE 43–56 (Timothy Lynch ed., 2009); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon,
54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 717 (2005).
30 Robert H. Jackson, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Federal Prosecutor, Address
Delivered at the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940), in 24
J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y. 18, 19 (1940).
31 See Richard K. Neumann, Jr., The Revival of Impeachment as a Partisan Political
Weapon, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 161, 162 (2007) (describing partisan impeachment in
disguise).
32 The criminality need not directly relate to the abuse of office. During the impeachment
of President Bill Clinton, some commentators advocated limiting the scope of impeachable
conduct by advancing an “executive function theory” of impeachment, i.e., a claim that a
President may only be impeached for criminal conduct directly related to the executive func-
tion or the use of executive authority. Jonathan Turley, Senate Trials and Factional Disputes:
Impeachment as a Madisonian Device, 49 DUKE L.J. 1, 100–02 (1999) (rejecting such a nar-
row view, but describing executive function theory advanced by testifying legal academics).
Contemporary impeachment practice of judges, at least, undermines any analogous “judicial
function theory” of the Impeachment Clauses. The House impeached and the Senate convicted
U.S. District Judge Harry Claiborne for tax fraud that occurred during his judicial tenure,
even though it was unrelated to the exercise of his judicial authority. ELEANORE BUSHNELL,
CRIMES, FOLLIES, AND MISFORTUNES: THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT TRIALS 296, 300–01 (1992).
impeachment extends only to “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misde-
meanors,”28 would-be impeachers select a target and then search for justificatory
grounds to remove.  Overcriminalization and the possibility of ethical lapses by the
target aid this effort.29  As former Attorney General Robert Jackson observed:
If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows that he
can choose his defendants.  Therein is the most dangerous power
of the prosecutor: that he will pick people that he thinks he should
get, rather than pick cases that need to be prosecuted.  With the
law books filled with a great assortment of crimes, a prosecutor
stands a fair chance of finding at least a technical violation of
some act on the part of almost anyone.  In such a case, it is not a
question of discovering the commission of a crime and then look-
ing for the man who has committed it, it is a question of picking
the man and then searching the law books, or putting investigators
to work, to pin some offense on him.30
The unhappy coincidence of colorably bad conduct in an ideological opponent
allows stealth constitutional hardball to be played.31  The constitutional hard-baller
stealthily deselects the opponent because of jurisprudential differences, by appealing
to the traditional grounds for impeachment.32
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33 See infra Part III.A.1.
34 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
35 Cf. Steven W. Fitschen, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Covenantal and Constitutional
Response to Judicial Tyranny, 10 REGENT U. L. REV. 111 (1998) (discussing the impeachment
of judges for constitutionally faithless decisions).
36 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joel Barlow (Mar. 14, 1801), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 223 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1905).
Alternatively, the plain view version of the tactic requires only a reading of the
Constitution that allows Congress to impeach judicial officers on grounds broader
than traditionally thought permitted by the Impeachment Grounds Clause.33  On the
one hand, this hardball variation is transparent; it avoids the need to establish odious
or criminally blameworthy conduct.  In other words, “this wolf comes as a wolf.”34
On the other hand, it may fail to bridge ideological and partisan divides and therefore
prove less effective.
The tactic of impeaching judicial opponents constitutes a species of constitutional
hardball.  Its object is disentrenchment of opponents followed by partisan entrench-
ment of allies, or in the case of brushbacks, in terrorem discipline of opponent adju-
dicators and their fellow jurisprudential travelers.  Further, its use might also establish
that the impeacher’s constitutional principles are right and that the target’s views, or
those of jurisprudential confederates, are in some sense wrong.35  Impeachment so
used to influence court membership and thereby secure constitutional change creates
a tension with several pre-constitutional understandings: (1) that formal constitutional
amendment and not a change in personnel appropriately serves the office of constitu-
tional change; (2) that impeachment was a legal tool for criminal and quasi-criminal
malfeasance by officeholders, not a tool for ideological or partisan cross-branch con-
trol; and (3) that the domain of law and policy are separate.  The stakes are high in this
match of constitutional hardball.  Successful use of impeachment tips court balances.
Unsuccessful use can result in making the tool unusable for that purpose for some
period of time, as failure would establish (or re-establish) a non-judicial precedent
rejecting impeachment on the basis of ideology.
B. The Re-emerging Tactic of Impeachment as Judicial Selection
Several episodes of impeachment as judicial selection—both stealthy and plain
view—pepper the history of the federal judiciary.  Below, this Article details the salient
examples of this constitutional hardball tactic.
1. Judge John Pickering and Justice Samuel Chase
In 1800, President Adams used the power to appoint in order to pack the court.
Thus, the Federalists “retreated into the judiciary as a stronghold” as they lost their grip
in Congress.36  Thomas Jefferson and the Jeffersonians embarked on a campaign to
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remove the Federalists by successfully impeaching U.S. District Judge John Pickering
and then attempting to impeach Associate Justice Samuel Chase.
The Pickering episode was the first judicial impeachment.37  The charges against
him included “mental derangement and chronic intoxication,” which Congress con-
sidered to be “high crimes and misdemeanors.”38  The House impeached, and the
Senate convicted.39  As evidence of partisanship, all Democratic-Republicans voted
“guilty” and all Federalists voted “not guilty.”40
This modest effort to remove a derelict preluded the pursuit of bigger bounty.
The close timing of the two impeachments fairly creates an inference that the two
events were connected.  The day after Judge Pickering was convicted and removed,
the House voted to impeach Justice Chase.41  Jeffersonians charged that Justice Chase
had breached judicial impartiality by making brazenly partisan statements from the
bench.42  As a result, they attempted his removal by impeachment.  This public justi-
fication, however, thinly veiled naked partisan and ideological motivation.  Chase’s
impeachment was a landmark as the first attempt to impeach a Supreme Court Justice.43
Although the impeachment is often remembered as unsuccessful, a partisan House
majority did impeach Chase and a partisan Senate majority did vote in favor of convic-
tion on three of the eight articles.44  Moreover, the six Democratic-Republican senators
who voted against conviction did not necessarily reject the legitimacy of ideological
impeachment.45  In the end, this plain view constitutional hardball failed.
2. Justices Abe Fortas and William Douglas
In 1969, Richard Nixon instigated a subterranean Jefferson-style campaign to
unpack the Court by targeting Associate Justice Abe Fortas.  This “impeachment” is
often missed because although congressional surrogates threatened impeachment,46
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they never actually introduced a House resolution calling for Fortas’s impeachment
or articles of impeachment.47  The Mitchell Justice Department investigated Fortas’s
financial dealings with convicted securities manipulator Louis Wolfson with an eye
to commencing impeachment proceedings, or at least an eye to precipitating Fortas’s
resignation.48  The pretext of Fortas’s alleged criminal wrongdoing shrouded Nixon’s
game of stealthy constitutional hardball.  Although academic commentators claim in
hindsight that Fortas broke no law (and therefore committed no indictable high crime
and misdemeanor),49 Nixon’s efforts yielded dividends.  Fortas resigned and created a
vacancy for Nixon to fill.50  The change aided Nixon in refashioning the Warren Court.
Nixon did not wait long before attempting impeachment as judicial selection
again.  On April 8, 1970, the Senate rejected Harrold Carswell, 51-45, as Richard
Nixon’s nominee to the vacancy created by the forced resignation of Justice Fortas.51
On April 15, 1970, then-Congressman Gerald Ford delivered a lengthy House address
calling for Justice William Douglas’s impeachment.52  The two events—the failed
appointment and the attempted impeachment—were apparently linked in Nixon’s
mind,53 but not merely as partisan payback as some have suggested.54  Nixon recog-
nized that appointment and impeachment are two sides of the judicial selection coin
and that there is more than one way to influence a collegial court’s work product.
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On the one hand, a President may appoint judges.55  On the other hand, Congress,
occasionally at a President’s behest or with his tacit approval, may attempt to deselect
incumbent judicial officers by impeaching them.
Together with then-Congressman Gerald Ford, Nixon coordinated this unsuc-
cessful campaign to impeach Justice Douglas for myriad peccadilloes,56 including his
pursuit of serial monogamy and receipt of money from a questionable foundation.57
As with Fortas, there was a pretext.  Here, however, that pretext was transparent.
Then-Representative Gerald Ford placed Nixon’s game of constitutional hardball in
plain view when he famously declared that an “impeachable offense is whatever a
majority of the House of Representatives considers [it] to be at a given moment in his-
tory; conviction results from whatever offense or offenses two-thirds of the other body
considers to be sufficiently serious to require removal of the accused from office.”58
The formal removal process ended when Democrats outwitted Republicans procedur-
ally and killed the impeachment effort in the House Judiciary Committee.59  Nixon’s
political opponents understood that membership matters and played constitutional
hardball defensively.
3. Judges Baer, Sarokin, and Other Democratic Judges
Beginning with the landslide November 1994 Republican congressional vic-
tory,60 House Republicans began playing constitutional hardball in a bid to disentrench
Democratic judicial appointees.  Initially, impeachment talk was limited to Senator
Bob Dole’s presidential bid.  It singled out Judge Harold Baer, a recent Clinton ap-
pointee, in order to portray the President as soft on crime.61  The criticism of Judge
Baer centered on his decision in a drug case to suppress evidence on the grounds that
it violated the Fourth Amendment.62  Eventually, that criticism snowballed into con-
gressional calls for his resignation.63  Dole escalated that rhetoric further by calling
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for Baer’s impeachment.64  In response to this constitutional hardball—calling for a
judge’s impeachment based on a judicial opinion—the Second Circuit took the excep-
tional step of publicly defending Judge Baer.65  Nonetheless, Judge Baer reconsidered
his decision and reversed himself.66  Although the call for Baer’s impeachment never
went anywhere, Dole’s threat may have secured the reversal by brushback.67
Perhaps emboldened by the March 1996 Baer brushback, Dole broadened his criti-
cism to name several more Democratic judges.  He named several recent appointees
to “Clinton’s Hall of Shame” on the basis of their judicial work product.68  One of
these judges, Third Circuit Judge Lee Sarokin, resigned in protest at the criticism.69
Sarokin’s resignation amounted to an apparent victory for Republicans.  It embold-
ened critics to demand the resignation or impeachment of alleged judicial activists.70
Properly or not, Republicans could claim a resignation and a brushback as fruits of
their impeachment campaign.
Outside of Congress, the rhetoric of this brand of constitutional hardball broad-
ened to the Supreme Court.  Religious conservatives, angered by the gay rights case
Romer v. Evans,71 called for impeachment of the Romer majority.72  No further serious
threat to impeach federal judges, however, was taken until after Republicans lost the
1996 presidential election.
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Republicans broadened and deepened their plain view constitutional hardball
efforts during the 105th Congress.  In March 1997, Representative Tom DeLay named
three federal judges as potential targets for impeachment and candidly cited the
ground for impeachment as their judicial opinions in particular cases.73  He noted that
he was collecting names of other possible candidates for the first impeachment.74
DeLay followed up his call for impeachment with a House Judiciary Committee hear-
ing in May 1997 that sought to justify ideological impeachment of judges.75  There,
he expressed his view that impeachment did not require an indictable offense: “when
judges exercise power not delegated to them by the Constitution, impeachment is a
proper tool.”76  Subsequently, he explained what he perceived to be the virtue of issu-
ing impeachment threats.  “The judges need to be intimidated.  They need to uphold
the Constitution. . . .  [W]e’re going to go after them in a big way.”77  Republican
senators were initially chilly toward their House colleagues’ proposal.78  Ultimately,
the Republican controlled House never voted any article of impeachment against these
federal judges.79
After the unsuccessful attempt to impeach Clinton and after the contested election
of President George W. Bush in 2000, congressional Republicans refocused their
efforts on appointing Republican federal judges rather than impeaching Democratic
appointees.  Republicans controlled both the White House and Congress.80  This
ability to change the composition of the federal judiciary abated the impeachment talk
and 2000–2002 was relatively free of explicit impeachment threats.
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Beginning with the 108th Congress, however, implicit threats of impeachment
returned.  Although Republicans regained a Senate majority during the 2002 election,81
Democratic Senate filibusters thwarted their attempts to appoint nominees to the
influential circuit courts in early 2003.82  When the appointments stalled, Republi-
cans again began to threaten Democratic judicial incumbents with impeachment.83
Like their prior impeachment threats, this constitutional hardball occurred in plain
view.  Congress tightened control over judicial discretion in sentencing when it en-
acted the PROTECT Act in 2003, which requires the reporting of the names of judges
who authorize downward departures in criminal sentencing.84  Chief Judge James
Rosenbaum of the District of Minnesota had testified against the Act in May 2002.85
In March 2003, Chairman James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) threatened to subpoena
Rosenbaum’s judicial records for those instances in which he departed from sentenc-
ing guidelines—a very rare request outside of an impeachment proceeding.86  Chief
Judge Rosenbaum was obligated to retain private counsel to defend himself and
negotiate a settlement.87
The Rosenbaum incident and statistical monitoring intimidated other federal
judges who might have chosen to depart downward from the criminal sentencing
guidelines.  Senior Judge Paul Magnuson declined to depart downward and cited, in
part, his fear of congressional reprisal.
There is another reason why the Court will not depart [downward]
in this matter.  The Court believes that the day of the downward
departure is past.  Congress and the Attorney General have insti-
tuted policies designed to intimidate and threaten judges into re-
fusing to depart downward, and those policies are working. . . .
[T]he Court is intimidated, and the Court is scared to depart.88
The threat evidently worked and “disciplined” Magnuson’s adjudication.
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Judge John Martin resigned from the Southern District of New York to pro-
test the reporting provision rather than comply.89  The perceived threat to judicial
independence—felt keenly by Judges Rosenbaum, Magnuson, and Martin—so con-
cerned Chief Justice William Rehnquist that he raised the issue of the PROTECT Act
in his 2003 and then 2004 Annual Report on the Judiciary.90  Rehnquist squarely re-
jected the notion of ideological impeachment: “a judge’s judicial acts may not serve
as a basis for impeachment.”91
During the 109th Congress, the federal court’s resolution of the Terri Schiavo case
provided another flash point for conservative Christians.92  A federal special bill pro-
vided for federal court jurisdiction over the Schiavo family’s dispute about whether
Theresa Schiavo might be removed from her feeding tubes.93  When federal judges
James Whitmore and Stanley Birch denied relief, DeLay called for their impeach-
ments.94  Michael Schwartz, chief of staff for Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK), threat-
ened “mass impeachment” of judges95 and used violent anti-judicial rhetoric: “I’m
a radical!  I’m a real extremist.  I don’t want to impeach judges.  I want to impale
them!”96  Conservative author Edwin Vieira used Stalinist rhetoric to advocate judi-
cial impeachment: “No man, no problem.”97  Beyond the verbal threats, Chairman
Sensenbrenner proposed the creation of an office of inspector general within the
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available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/10-06/igbill/index.html (quoting Chief Justice John
Roberts as criticizing inspector general proposals as “dangerous intrusions by other branches”).
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Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Aug. 1, 2002) ,available at http://www.washingtonpost
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General, Office of Legal Counsel to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Central
Intelligence Agency, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative, (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://i
.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2009/images/05/22/bybee.pdf (eighteen-page memorandum memorial-
izing advice concerning the legal permissibility of “ten techniques” to be used during the
interrogation of Abu Zubaydah).
105 See memoranda cited supra note 104.
judiciary to investigate ethics complaints lodged against judges.98  The proposal was
again a thinly masked threat to judges and rebuffed by Chief Justice John Roberts.99
This Republican constitutional hardball, however, soon ceased before it could
gain further steam.  DeLay, an animating force behind the movement to impeach
as judicial selection, was forced to resign from House leadership due to a criminal
indictment100 and the 2006 congressional elections stripped Republicans of their
bicameral majorities.101
4. Judge Jay Bybee
In January 2009, President Barack Obama assumed office with bicameral major-
ities in Congress.102  Soon afterward, congressional Democrats called for the impeach-
ment of U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Jay Bybee.  Prior to his judicial appointment by
President George W. Bush in March 2003, Assistant Attorney General Bybee headed
the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC).103  During his tenure there,
the White House and CIA asked OLC to advise them on whether certain interrogation
methods constituted “torture” within the meaning of federal statutes implementing
the Convention Against Torture.104  In August 2002, OLC produced two memoranda
that defined torture narrowly and qualifiedly approved specific interrogation methods.105
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These top secret memoranda concerning the “War on Terror” remained undisclosed
during Judge Bybee’s March 2003 Senate confirmation hearing.106  Although key
members of the House and Senate had apparently received briefings on these memo-
randa prior to Judge Bybee’s confirmation,107 the Washington Post did not publish
the memoranda until June 2004.108  Five years later, in April 2009, during the early
months of the Obama administration, Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) and
Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI) called for Bybee’s impeachment.109  Similarly, Senator
Patrick Leahy (D-VT) asked Bybee to resign.110  They cited his pre-confirmation legal
advice while at OLC as the basis for impeachment.
Unlike the plain view constitutional hardball Republicans played previously, the
threat to impeach Bybee is principally stealthy and not plain view, constitutional hard-
ball.  These calls for his impeachment do not fault particular judicial opinions or his
jurisprudence per se (at least since appointment to judicial office).  Instead, they charac-
terize Bybee’s former OLC advice as possibly constituting indictable criminal conduct
under domestic and international law,111 or alternatively unethical advice amounting
to a high crime and misdemeanor.112  Thus, the threat attempts to situate the ground
for removal into the traditional category of “other high crimes and misdemeanors.”
Notwithstanding the traditional characterization, the threat to impeach Bybee
is constitutional hardball.  Although any impeachment would turn on Bybee’s legal
analysis at OLC, that work product arose from a different office, i.e., the proposed
ground for impeachment would entail removing him from an office he no longer
holds.  Such an impeachment becomes meaningful to advocates for removal only
if any impeachment judgment of conviction were to disqualify Bybee from holding
“any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States”—including by happen-
stance his present federal judgeship.113  Indeed, had Bybee returned to legal academia,
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of honor, trust, or profit under the United States.” GERHARDT, supra note 47, at 60. Thus, he
was eligible to be elected to Congress. The Senate “vote[s] separately or not at all on whether
to disqualify the convicted official from holding future office.” Id. at 35.
114 No one has sought to impeach John Yoo, who was also an officer of the United States
at the time OLC advised on interrogation and torture. See Vick, supra note 106, at A4.
115 Yale law professor Bruce Ackerman’s call for Bybee’s impeachment cited the fact that
at confirmation the Senate knew little about his advice at OLC. Bruce Ackerman, Impeach
Jay Bybee, SLATE, Jan. 13, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2208517/.
116 For example, George H.W. Bush’s Chief of Staff John Sununu boasted famously that
stealth nominee Justice David Souter would be a “home run” for conservatives. David J.
Garrow, Justice Souter Emerges, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 25, 1994, at 52.
it is unlikely critics would have sought to impeach him from his OLC office.114  Im-
peachment employed in this mode serves principally as a post-confirmation opportunity
for (de)selection, a confirmation do-over.115
II. THE TEMPTATION OF IMPEACHMENT AS JUDICIAL SELECTION
What motivates the pathology of impeachment as judicial selection?  Control over
how officers exercise power is the shared central concern of appointment to and re-
moval from office.  As a species of removal power, impeachment can claim important
advantages over appointment as a tool of control.  Given this common end, impeach-
ment as judicial selection might prove a tempting—even if wrong-headed—alternative
to appointment.
This section elaborates the allure of deselection as a species of constitutional
hardball.  First, as an ex post appointment tool, impeachment boasts informational
advantages.  Whereas appointment is forward looking and relies on political actors’
mere projections of a prospective appointee’s future performance, impeachment has
the benefit of hindsight.  Second, impeachment facilitates transformative appointments.
It permits the political branches to initiate judicial deselection without the need to
wait for judges to create a vacancy.  Finally, successful deselection rebalances the
selection playing field in favor of Congress.  It curtails the appointments leverage
that a President as first mover usually enjoys over Congress.
A. Ex Post Appointment Informational Advantage
There is wide dissatisfaction with the modern appointments process because
Presidents, senators, and interest groups must rely on incomplete, imperfect, or other-
wise inadequate pre-confirmation information about nominees.  A President and his
advisors may incorrectly forecast the future voting behavior of a stealth nominee,
i.e., a jurist nominated because his or her limited or dated paper trail will permit flying
under senatorial confirmation radar.116  In such a case, stealth proves a double-edged
sword.  Issues not of contemporary concern at a nominee’s confirmation occasionally
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117 In 1986, the Court upheld a state statute criminalizing adult consensual sodomy.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). It probably was not foreseen at the time of Justice
Kennedy’s appointment to the Court in 1988 that a then-settled question eventually would
be revisited and overruled in a new political and cultural climate. See Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (majority opinion written by Kennedy, J.).
118 Compare, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405–14 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (joining the dissenters in declining to rule the death penalty unconstitutional), with
Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of cert.)
(declaring that “[f]rom this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death”).
119 Prospective nominee Sandra Day O’Connor reportedly offered to Ronald Reagan that
she believed “the regulation of abortions was in fact a legitimate subject for legislative action.”
DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE SELECTION
OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 140 (1999). But see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (Justice O’Connor writing for majority and reaffirming “essential
holding of Roe v. Wade”).
120 For instance, President Dwight Eisenhower’s selection of Justice William Brennan
may have “had more to do with [electoral] politics than with philosophical compatibility.”
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: HOW THE CHOICE OF SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY 52 (1985).
121 After all, many Justices typically described as “liberal” were Republican appointees
from an era predating the Reagan presidency: Earl Warren (Eisenhower), William Brennan
(Eisenhower), Harry Blackmun (Nixon), and John Paul Stevens (Ford). To this list, social
conservatives may add post-Reagan Republican appointees Sandra Day O’Connor (Reagan),
Anthony Kennedy (Reagan), and David Souter (G.H.W. Bush). See SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www
.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2010); THE WHITE HOUSE,
THE PRESIDENTS, http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
122 TRIBE, supra note 120, at 100.
123 MICHAEL COMISKEY, SEEKING JUSTICES: THE JUDGING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES
134 (2004) (describing position of those who subscribe to this view).
124 See, e.g., Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United State:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 187 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts
become important during his or her tenure.117  A nominee’s views may evolve.118
Alternatively, a nominee may misrepresent or conceal views to curry favor and secure
presidential nomination.119  To be sure, nominee voting behavior may differ from par-
tisan or ideological expectations because a President selected a nominee for short-term
tactical, rather than long-term strategic, considerations.120  Nonetheless, it remains
that appointments do occur under conditions of imperfect information.  The resultant
uncertainty may prove more of a political risk to a President than a tool to successfully
advance his agenda.121
Senators too may not know enough to “intelligently fulfill their constitutional role
in the appointment process without knowing where Supreme Court nominees stand
on important precedents and issues.”122  It is a common complaint that the Senate con-
firmation process does not elicit “enough about nominees’ legal ideologies to give
meaningful, informed consent to Supreme Court nominations.”123  This lack of infor-
mation may result from a President choosing a stealth nominee.124  In addition, the
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Nomination] (statement of J. Roberts) (citing Justice Ginsburg’s declination to respond to
certain types of inquiries). On the other hand, some political scientists have suggested that,
notwithstanding these tactics, the public can still accurately forecast voting behavior. See,
e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal et al., The Role of Ideology in Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court
Justices, 77 KY. L.J. 485, 495–97 (1989) (categorizing statements found in newspaper editorials
from New York Times, Washington Post, L.A. Times, and Chicago Tribune from nomination
until Senate confirmation and concluding that correlation between Justices’ voting behavior and
the editorials was 0.80 in civil rights and liberties cases).
125 JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE
FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 282, 284 (2007) (noting Harriet
Miers’s pretextual invocation of executive privilege).
126 See, e.g., Nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to be an Associate Justice of the United
States Supreme Court: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009)
[hereinafter Sotomayor Nomination] (statement of J. Sotomayor) (rejecting President Obama’s
empathy criterion for appointments); Roberts Nomination, supra note 124, at 146–47 (statement
of J. Roberts) (distancing himself from comments in 1981 memo to Attorney General William
French Smith in which he referred to “so-called right to privacy”).
127 Justice Sotomayor described her statement that a “wise Latina” jurist would often reach
better decisions than a white male counterpart as a “rhetorical flourish that fell flat.” Sotomayor
Nomination, supra note 126 (statement of J. Sotomayor). Similarly, Justice Alito had pre-
viously declared that he “believe[d] very strongly in the supremacy of the elected branches of
Government.” Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 346
(2006) [hereinafter Alito Nomination] (statement of J. Alito). He later retreated and described that
statement as a “very inapt phrase.” Id. When pressed by Senator Kennedy, he explained that
he had not changed his mind but that his “phrasing” was “very misleading and incorrect.” Id.
128 Alito Nomination, supra note 127, at 454–55 (statement of J. Alito) (evading answering
whether Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), is “the settled law of the land”).
129 Compare, e.g., Nominations of Abe Fortas and Homer Thornberry: Hearings Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 104 (1968) (statement of J. Fortas) (“Let me say in
the first place—and make this absolutely clear—that since I have been a Justice, the President
of the United States has never, directly or indirectly, approximately or remotely, talked to me
about anything before the Court or that might come before the Court. I want to make that
absolutely clear.”), with Audio tape: Recording of Telephone Conversation between President
Lyndon B. Johnson and Justice Abe Fortas (Oct. 6, 1966) (Recordings and Transcripts of
Conversations and Meetings #10929, LBJ Library) (preserving conversation between President
Johnson and Justice Fortas discussing Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966), then pending
before Court) (on file with author). Although nominees may occasionally lie during confir-
mation hearings, it is likely infrequent. After all, it has long been a felony to knowingly and
willfully “make[ ] any materially false . . . statement or representation” in any “matter within
the jurisdiction of the . . . legislative . . . branch of the Government of the United States.” 18
U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (2006).
nomination of former executive branch officials means that nominees increasingly
cite executive privilege and decline to answer senators’ questions.125  Nominees may
also distance themselves from prior positions,126 modulate,127 evade,128 and (occasion-
ally) prevaricate.129  This possibility of stealthy nominees problematizes the exercise
of senatorial advice and consent.
2010] IMPEACHMENT AS JUDICIAL SELECTION? 617
130 Nomination of John Paul Stevens to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 78 (1975) (testi-
mony of Margaret Drachsler, National Organization for Women) (expressing NOW’s “grave
concern” about nomination of Justice Stevens).
131 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 220–23 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (dissent-
ing from the opinion upholding federal regulations that prohibited abortion counseling with
Title X funds).
132 Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 426–27
(1989) (statement of Jeffrey Levi, Executive Director, National Gay & Lesbian Task Force).
133 Id. at 427.
134 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
135 Nomination of David H. Souter to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 363 (1991)
(statement of Kate Michelman, Executive Director, NARAL).
136 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, JJ., lead opinion).
137 See Linda Greenhouse, On Privacy and Equality: Judge Ginsburg Still Voices Strong
Doubts on Rationale Behind Roe v. Wade Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1993, at A1.
138 Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. Pt. 3, 56 (2003) (statement of John Roberts, Nominee to be Circuit
Judge for the District of Columbia Circuit).
Even interest groups, who are among the best-informed actors in the appointments
process, stumble in their assessment of nominees.  They occasionally have challenged
nominees who would prove friendly or reliable votes in favor of their positions on
issues of interest.  The National Organization of Women opposed nominee John
Paul Stevens’s nomination to the Court,130 but Justice Stevens has reliably supported
women’s rights.131  The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force challenged nominee
Anthony Kennedy.132  Citing the Supreme Court’s Bowers v. Hardwick decision,
Executive Director Jeffrey Levi similarly suggested that Kennedy had “a far too nar-
row definition of the universe of Americans entitled to the rights guaranteed under
the Constitution.”133  Justice Kennedy authored the opinion that overruled Bowers.134
The National Abortion Rights Action League inveighed against nominee David Souter
and expressed its concern that “if confirmed, Judge Souter would destroy 17 years
of precedent and cast the deciding vote to overrule Roe v. Wade.”135  Instead, Justice
Souter cast a deciding vote to preserve “the essential holding of Roe v. Wade.”136
Leaders of NARAL and NOW Legal Defense and Educational Fund expressed their
concern about Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s criticism of the legal reasoning relied on in Roe
v. Wade.137  These examples of confirmation friendly fire illustrate the imperfection
of ex ante information.
The difference between vertical and horizontal precedent compounds the difficulty
for all political actors in discerning nominees’ views before appointment.  Nominees
to lower federal courts—where vertical precedent carries the command of a superior
court’s edict—may declare that Roe v. Wade is “settled law.”138  However, how
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139 See generally Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Partial-Birth Abortion and the Perils of
Constitutional Common Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 519 (2008) (describing
meandering path to Gonzalez v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) from Roe, Casey, and
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)).
140 CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH & JOYCE A. BAUGH, THE REAL CLARENCE THOMAS:
CONFIRMATION VERACITY MEETS PERFORMANCE REALITY 202 (2000) (proposing that
Congress impeach Justice Clarence Thomas on the basis that they allege his confirmation
testimony was not truthful); Neumann, supra note 31, at 301–12 (suggesting grounds for
impeaching Justice Thomas).
141 Unlike recall, it would not suffer from the collective action problem that stymies any
effort to organize large numbers of voters to remove an incumbent.
142 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
143 John M. de Figueiredo & Emerson H. Tiller, Congressional Control of the Courts: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Expansion of the Federal Judiciary, 39 J.L. & ECON.
435, 435 n.1 (1996).
probative is such a statement when the lower federal court judge is to be appointed
to the Court, where precedent holds only a prudential claim on the Court’s future
action?  The problem becomes more acute in areas such as abortion regulation where
one suspects that precedent, protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, has little
relationship with case outcomes and more to do with Justices’ policy preferences.139
In contrast, an ex post strategy of impeachment as judicial selection overcomes
difficulties with stealth nominees, or at least becomes a parachute if an appointment
should not work out.  The President, the Senate, and interest groups will have better
information on how a judge will perform after a judge has actually performed on the
court.  Ex post selection obviates the need to forecast how judges will vote on legal
issues unforeseeable at the time of appointment.  It removes some of the guesswork
from judicial selection and promotes democratic constitutionalism in the same way
that ill-informed, ex ante ideological appointment does.
In addition, impeachment would permit the President or the Senate to enforce
representations made to it by a nominee under oath that later turned out to be false.140
This ex post appointment check would function similarly to an electoral recall petition
where the appointed officer betrays the political trust that secured his office.141  Even
if not actually used, impeachment so threatened would promote nominee veracity,
not mendacity.
B. Transformative Change in Judicial Personnel
Although the U.S. Constitution’s formal description of the appointment power
suggests the President initiates the process when he nominates,142 individual members
of the judiciary actually control the commencement of the process—at least when
it comes to the Court or inferior courts where Congress is unwilling to authorize
additional judgeships.  The traditional regime of ideological appointment results in
the President and Congress waiting more or less passively for a judge to retire.143
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144 The Court experienced an eleven-year period of stability in its membership from
August 1994 until September 2005. During that period, neither Clinton nor George W. Bush
could appoint any Justice to the Court. United States Senate, Supreme Court Nominations,
present–1789, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm
[hereinafter Supreme Court Nominations] (last visited Feb. 24, 2009).
145 See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS
OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 36–40 (2005) (noting anecdotal evidence of politically timed
retirements); ARTEMUS WARD, DECIDING TO LEAVE: THE POLITICS OF RETIREMENT FROM
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 12 (2003) (arguing that retirement process has become
more partisan over time due to generous retirement benefits and light case load); Deborah
J. Barrow & Gary Zuk, An Institutional Analysis of Turnover in the Lower Federal Courts,
1900–1987, 52 J. POL. 457, 472–73 (1990) (observing consistent association between presi-
dential elections and judicial retirement in lower federal courts); Timothy M. Hagle, Strategic
Retirements: A Political Model of Turnover on the United States Supreme Court, 15 POL.
BEHAV. 25, 36–37 (1993) (concluding that choice to retire is not independent of political
events); James F. Spriggs, II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Calling It Quits: Strategic Retirement on
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1893–1991, 48 POL. RES. Q. 573, 592 (1995) (concluding that
judges “delay their departure until the appropriate party enters office and then leave fairly
quickly”). But see, e.g., David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Retaining Life Tenure: The Case
for a “Golden Parachute,” 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1397, 1433–35 (2005) (critiquing strategic retire-
ment thesis, Hagle’s study, and use of anecdotal evidence susceptible to multiple interpre-
tations); Albert Yoon, Pensions, Politics, and Judicial Tenure: An Empirical Study of Federal
Judges, 1869–2002, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 143 (2006) (concluding Article III judges time
their retirements from active service based on when they qualify for their judicial pensions).
146 Justice David Souter’s resignation might provide another example of an auspicious
vacancy. Although Souter reportedly had wanted to resign in disgust after the Court’s decision
in Bush v. Gore in 2000, JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE
SUPREME COURT 177 (2007), he remained in office until a Democratic administration. The
leaks of Souter’s intent to resign came within the first hundred days of the Obama presidency,
see Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Justice Souter to Retire, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO,
Apr. 30, 2009, and within two days of the announcement that Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA)
would become a Democrat, providing President Obama with a sixty-vote filibuster-proof
majority with which to confirm a replacement for Souter. Carl Hulse & Adam Nagourney,
Specter Switches Parties; More Heft for Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009, at A1.
Retirement creates a vacancy that the elected branches may then fill to affect votes
on a collegial court.  This sit-and-wait strategy could mean that a lengthy period tran-
spires before a President is able to steer the court in his or her direction.144
Moreover, some political scientists subscribe to the strategic retirement thesis,
i.e., that Justices and judges politically calculate their retirements from the bench.
These holdout judges may time their retirements to help or hinder a President with
whom they agree or disagree on matters of law and public policy.145  Health and per-
sonal circumstances permitting, a judge’s politically timed retirement may mean that
a President is more likely to have an opportunity to appoint someone ideologically
close to him, as judicial opponents hold out and as judicial allies retire auspiciously
to create vacancies.146  This phenomenon may limit a President to the modest goals of
prolonging the Court’s jurisprudential status quo with the appointment of younger
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147 For a proposal to defeat the strategy by limiting the length of judicial tenures by way
of fixed, nonrenewable terms, see Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for
the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 801–07,
822–24 (2006).
148 On the basis of the Segal-Cover perceived ideology scale, Ruth Bader Ginsburg has
been characterized as the most liberal sitting Justice. See EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 145,
at 110. On the other hand, a Democratic Congress could seek to initiate impeachment pro-
ceedings against Antonin Scalia, the most conservative sitting Justice according to that same
measure. Id.
149 ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION, AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 29
(3d ed. 2001).
150 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
151 THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 394 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001).
jurists and securing incremental change in only a few, low visibility areas of law.147
Thus, the passive wait-and-appoint strategy may result in few occasions for trans-
formative appointments.
In contrast, impeaching a judicial opponent who would not otherwise retire creates
not only a vacancy where there was none before, but enables a President to affect
a collegial court’s status quo voting balance by defeating holdout efforts.  It avoids
inaction when no voluntary retirement or serendipitous vacancy is forthcoming.
Moreover, a President (or the Senate) could maximize the effect of an impeachment
by “deselecting” that Justice who is most ideologically distant, rather than pursuing
the passive appointments scenario where a President’s allies retire.  Thus, a President
during united government could seek to initiate impeachment of ideologically opposed
or distant Justices, such as those who might hold out for another administration
before retiring.148
On the other hand, during periods of divided government, Congress might attempt
to impeach a President’s allies on the Court, forcing the nomination of more moderate
Justices to secure confirmation.  In either case, ideological selection would not halt
simply because judges refuse to initiate the appointments process by creating vacancies.
This particular example illustrates what may be yet another temptation of ideological
impeachment: denying a President the first-mover advantage in appointments.
C. Shifting First-Mover Advantage: Congress as First Mover
The appointments process favors the nominating President over the Senate and
over competing interest groups by granting to the President a first-mover advantage.
A first-mover advantage describes those situations where a party gains a special
advantage from acting first.149  The Appointments Clause grants the President the
right to act first by giving him the initial and sole power to nominate.150  Alexander
Hamilton correctly intuited that it would not be “probable, that [the President’s] nomi-
nation would often be overruled.”151  If senators reject a nomination, they “could not
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152 Id.
153 The lower court confirmation rates for five prior administrations are: Carter (91.9%),
Reagan (93.1%), G.H.W. Bush (79.3%), Clinton (84.0%), and G.W. Bush (78.1%). DENIS
STEVEN RUTKUS & MITCHEL A. SOLLENBERGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., JUDICIAL
NOMINATION STATISTICS: U.S. DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT COURTS, 1977–2003, at 13 tbl.2(b)
(2004), available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RL31635.pdf. Nominees
to the Supreme Court have been confirmed 77.4% of the time (123 confirmed out of 159
nominations). See Supreme Court Nominations, supra note 144.
154 EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 145, at 21 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 76).
155 See infra Part IV.A.
156 Id.
157 See, e.g., United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842 (9th Cir.) (holding that a sitting judge
was not immune to criminal prosecution before removal through impeachment) cert. denied,
469 U.S. 829 (1984); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.) (upholding criminal
conviction of Judge Otto Kerner prior to impeachment), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
158 District Judge Halsted Ritter was impeached and convicted on the basis of a non-
indictable offense. See Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 293 (1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S.
668 (1937) (finding no jurisdiction to entertain challenge to conviction and removal on basis
that article of impeachment did not allege a high crime or misdemeanor). Ritter’s impeach-
ment conviction appears to be an example of ideological deselection. See infra note 340 and
accompanying text.
even be certain, that a future nomination would present a candidate in any degree
more acceptable to them.”152  Although the Senate has handed Presidents spectacular
defeats in the past, there is an advantage to moving first in the selection process: recent
presidential administrations boast judicial confirmation rates exceeding seventy-five
percent.153  That is not to say that the President’s first-mover advantage by itself en-
tirely accounts for the high confirmation success rate.  It doubtless results in part from
the “silent operation” of the Senate’s power to confirm, i.e., the in terrorem effect
of an administration anticipating Senate opposition and then moderating its choice
of nominee to secure approval.154
In contrast, impeachment as a judicial selection tool may confer on congressional
majorities an important first-mover advantage, allowing them to match the President’s
own first-mover advantage in the field of appointments.  While executive-legislative
divided government has become more commonplace in the latter half of the twentieth
century, intra-legislative division has declined.155  Thus, the increase in divided gov-
ernment and the concurrent decline in intra-legislative division give Congress not only
the principal role in initiating impeachment, but strengthen its ability to obtain it.156
To be sure, a President can initiate impeachments, for example, by collaborating with
congressional allies to secure or threaten impeachment.  Moreover, executive action—
criminal investigation, prosecution, and imprisonment upon conviction—often has
preluded several modern judicial impeachments157 and therefore an inert Congress
may have come to depend on the Executive to do its dirty work before acting itself.
But Congress has impeached judges on the basis of nonindictable grounds,158 and
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159 Some commentators have argued that criminal conviction, or at least imprisonment
pursuant to a conviction, must not precede removal by impeachment. See, e.g., Melissa H.
Maxman, Note, In Defense of the Constitution’s Judicial Impeachment Standard, 86 MICH.
L. REV. 420, 431 (1987) (arguing that imprisonment pursuant to a criminal conviction is at
odds with Article III tenure).
160 On October 1, 1968, during the final months of President Johnson’s administration,
twenty-four Senate Republicans and nineteen Senate Democrats pursued an analogous strategy.
Together they blocked a confirmation vote on the proposed elevation of Abe Fortas to be Chief
Justice Earl Warren’s successor. 114 CONG. REC. 28,933 (1968). The blocked confirmation
prevented Johnson from filling the vacancy and permitted Richard Nixon, elected just over
a month later, to fill it. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
161 See Tushnet, supra note 6, at 531.
nothing in the Constitution requires conviction to precede impeachment.159  Further,
frequent divided government limits a President’s ability to use impeachment ideologi-
cally, unless clear independent grounds exist for impeachment, such as bribery, treason,
or high crimes and misdemeanors.  If the political context is favorable—divided gov-
ernment with adequate votes to transform a collegial court—Congress may choose to
act first.  Rather than using criminal investigation as a means of fact-finding, Congress
may use its own investigative powers.
Additionally, ideological use of impeachment may assist the Senate in obtaining
better leverage over a President than it would enjoy otherwise in the appointments
process.  Impeachment gives the Senate two bites at the selection apple.  First, it re-
moves an existing jurist—presumably one of the judges most ideologically distant
from the congressional majority—and thereby immediately affects the voting balance
on the collegial court.  Second, when the President attempts to fill the vacancy, the
Senate may use its advice-and-consent power to complement its impeachment power
by moderating or even directing the President’s choice of nominee.  Alternately, the
Senate may opt to prevent any further appointment altogether and maintain the short-
staffed court balance until an ideologically allied administration assumes office.160
Either approach would permit the Senate to take advantage of a process Congress
would initiate.
Thus, impeachment offers important practical advantages over appointment.  It
is more accurate as a judicial selection tool due to its availability ex post confirmation.
It is more flexible than nomination in response to passive resignation.  Its results are
potentially far more dramatic, particularly when no opponent’s vacancy is forthcom-
ing.  Finally, impeachment allows Congress to participate in judicial selection as a
first mover.
III. THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST IMPEACHMENT AS JUDICIAL
SELECTION
According to Mark Tushnet, a defining feature of constitutional hardball is the
availability to each side of colorable legal arguments.161  These hardball arguments
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162 Id.
163 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (describing House power to impeach).
164 Id. at art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (describing Senate power to try impeachments).
165 Id. at art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (describing permissible judgments pursuant to an impeachment
conviction).
166 Id. at art. II, § 4 (describing permissible grounds for impeachment).
167 Id.
might be strained, but they must not be frivolous.162  These arguments, however, nec-
essarily question a pre-constitutional understanding.  In this situation, the hard-ballers
seek to upset the settled understanding that federal judges are not impeachable on the
basis of their ideology or judicial work product.  They propose replacing that under-
standing with an impeachment power that may serve as an ex post appointment tool
for judicial deselection, a recall mechanism.
The stealthy version of this constitutional hardball targets nominees on the basis
of ideology or work product, but pretextually claims that the target’s alleged miscon-
duct falls within traditionally accepted grounds for impeachment.  Thus, the stealthy
tool requires the coincidence of bad, or at least questionable, behavior on the part of
the target that may be characterized as “impeachable” in the traditionally accepted
sense.  As such, the stealthy tactic requires no wholesale reworking of impeachment’s
scope, only (perhaps) its piecemeal, incremental expansion.
By contrast, the plain view tactic openly targets an officer selected on the basis of
ideology or work product and seeks removal on grounds traditionally thought beyond
impeachment’s reach.  Because it does not claim to operate within the traditionally
accepted categories, it must offer colorable justifications for the broader grounds for
impeachment.  Part III examines those arguments that might seek to justify plain view
ideological impeachment and their counterarguments.  They rely on arguments from
constitutional text, structure, historical practice, and purpose.
A. Arguments for Impeachment as Judicial Selection
1. Constitutional Text
Proponents of impeachment as a tool of judicial selection might argue that the
Impeachment,163 Impeachment Trial,164 Impeachment Judgment,165 and Impeachment
Grounds166 Clauses (collectively, “the Impeachment Clauses”) do not prevent de-
selection of judges because impeachment is not limited to indictable offenses.  The
Impeachment Grounds Clause provides, in relevant part, that a civil officer of the
United States may be impeached for “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.”167  As judges are civil officers of the United States, they are subject
to impeachment under this general provision.  Bribery and treason are indictable
offenses that must be proved to the Senate’s satisfaction in order to convict.  How-
ever, the English common law term of art “high crimes and misdemeanors” had “no
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relation to whether an indictment would lie in the particular circumstances.”168
Professor Raoul Berger offered the interpretation that, as applied to federal judges,
the phrase did “not limit the common law scope of ‘high crimes and misdemeanors’
when the subject of impeachment is a judge.”169  This approach is consistent with
views expressed during the Virginia ratifying convention.170
The ratification era understanding of “high crimes and misdemeanors,” though
mixed, encompasses the impeachment of judges for their work product.  Hamilton
responded to an objection that under the Constitution the judiciary could claim suprem-
acy to Congress and usurp its prerogative by claiming the power to “constru[e] the laws
according to the spirit of the constitution.”171  He cited impeachment of such jurists,
who repeatedly and willfully engage in such conduct, as a ready remedy for mischie-
vous work product.172  Similarly, George Mason expressed his view that a President’s
“attempts to subvert the Constitution” were grounds for impeachment,173 which a
fortiori would apply to judges, the removal of which would prove less traumatic to
the nation as a whole.  On the other hand, James Wilson questioned whether it would
be proper for the House to impeach judges for the performance of their duties.174
In any case, the interpretation of the phrase “high crimes and misdemeanors”
might present a nonjusticiable question.  The Court in Walter Nixon v. United States175
concluded that the Impeachment Trial Clause’s assignment to the Senate of the “sole”
power to try constituted a “textually demonstrable” commitment of the matter.176
Indeed, it stated more broadly that “[j]udicial involvement in impeachment proceed-
ings . . . would eviscerate the ‘important constitutional check’ placed on the Judiciary
by the Framers.”177  Analogously, the Impeachment Clause grants to the House the
“sole” power to impeach, or indict.178  Per Nixon’s rationale, whether “high crimes
and misdemeanors” may encompass dissatisfaction with the manner in which, for
example, a judge discharges his duties likely lies beyond judicial cognizance.
2. Structure
Hardballers may argue the place of Article III judges in our constitutional structure
justifies Congress in using impeachment as a mechanism to control the substantive
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work product of the judiciary.  Located in Article II, the Impeachment Grounds
Clause, which applies to “the President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the
United States,”179 may be read together with Article III as holding federal judges to
a more exacting standard than other officers, but still using the same impeachment
procedural machinery.180  The Impeachment Grounds Clause permits removal upon
conviction for “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”181  By
contrast, Article III requires only “good Behaviour” as a condition for continuing
to hold office.182  It may be reconciled with the Impeachment Grounds Clause by in-
voking the canon that more specific provisions govern over more general ones.183
Whereas the Impeachment Grounds Clause governs civil officers of the United States
in general and is located in Article II, “good Behaviour” covers judicial officers spe-
cifically and is located in Article III.184  On this account, “good behaviour” does not
simply cross-reference the Impeachment Grounds Clause,185 but requires a higher
standard of conduct.  Judges must avoid not only the affirmatively bad behavior of
treason, bribery, and similar offenses; their behavior must be affirmatively good.  This
interpretation still requires impeachment’s procedural machinery—indictment by
the House, trial by the Senate—to remove a judge.  But what constitutes “not-good”
behavior could prove as discretionary as what grounds Congress may appropriately
consider in discharging its power to advise and consent in the appointments context.
Thus, this interpretation may give Congress the additional discretionary space it
needs to impeach expressly on the basis of ideology.  After all, when “good” modi-
fies behavior, it does not describe an objective characteristic inhering in a judge, but
the observer’s subjective judgment.
What constitutes “not-good” behavior may prove slippery and provide wiggle
room for ideologically motivated impeachment of judges.  Impeachable conduct may
prove to be whatever Congress says it is.186  And so long as the Senate does not resort
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to a coin toss to resolve whether to remove, it is unclear that it would be justiciable.187
Consider how a congressional majority playing constitutional hardball and seeking to
remove an incumbent jurist could define “not-good” behavior.  For example, impeach-
ment could be employed against judicial opponents who deride law enforcement in
dicta;188 rely on or cite to foreign law;189 delegate substantial decision making authority
to law clerks;190 attend judicial education conferences at expensive vacation resorts;191
duck hunt with a party named in his official capacity in a pending case;192 accept gen-
erous honoraria paid by former clients for a lecture series;193 manipulate panel compo-
sition to favor particular outcomes in pending cases;194 engage in serial monogamy
and extramarital affairs;195 or repeatedly stay an execution in disobedience to a hier-
archically superior court.196  This constitutional hardball standard would require only
that Congress determine that a judge has violated the good behavior condition; the
judge need not engage in indictable conduct or in nonindictable grave political of-
fenses.  Reading the Article II Impeachment Grounds Clause together with Article III
allows constitutional hard-ballers to apply a more exacting (and elastic) standard to
the judiciary than to non-Article III officers.
3. Post-ratification Historical Practice
Defenders of ideological impeachment can claim post-ratification historical prac-
tice to justify viewpoint-conscious judicial impeachment.  This approach may justify
ideological selection as “no new thing under the sun,”197 but a venerable continuation
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of politics by other means.  Because these provisions are nonjusticiable, the non-
judicial precedents provide an interpretive “gloss which life has written upon them”198
as to what “other high Crimes and Misdemeanors” or “good Behaviour” mean.
Ideological impeachment, at least several good attempts, can boast a venerable
pedigree stretching back to the Ninth Congress.  As previously mentioned, Congress
impeached and convicted Judge John Pickering for grounds that were not treason,
bribery, or a high crime and misdemeanor—his probable insanity and alcoholism—and
it did so by partisan margins.  Soon after, the Jeffersonians targeted Justice Samuel
Chase.199  Opponents of ideological impeachment cite Justice Chase’s failed impeach-
ment as establishing the principle that judges may not be impeached for their work
product.200  Of course, as a non-judicial precedent, it is unclear what proposition the
Samuel Chase impeachment exactly stands for.  Beyond its place of anecdotal priority,
one can draw opposite inferences from the Chase episode.  The failure to impeach
Chase may have demonstrated only a lack of supermajority congressional will, not
congressional incapacity.  It may be simply a historical accident Congress does not
regularly impeach judges for opinions and conduct it considers “activist.”
Further, the Chase episode was neither the alpha nor the omega of ideological
impeachment.  It is not the most recent precedent.  Congress impeached and convicted
Judges Robert W. Archbald and Halsted Ritter in 1912 and 1936, respectively, for
nonindictable offenses,201 even if not for judicial opinions.  Later, President Richard
Nixon successfully precipitated the resignation of Justice Fortas and helped margin-
alize Justice Douglas.202  With the hindsight of historical research, it is clear that the
jurists’ ideologies motivated the efforts to prosecute and/or impeach them and that no
traditionally accepted “high Crime or Misdemeanor” supported impeachment.203  If
there is a principle barring the impeachment of judges based on ideology, it is honored
in the breach.
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4. Purpose—Democratic Constitutionalism
To justify deselecting judges, proponents of ideological appointment may char-
acterize the purpose of the impeachment clauses as safeguarding democratic consti-
tutionalism.  Because the Court claims the final word in interpreting the Constitution
and because Article V amendment is cumbersome,204 American democracy lacks any
effective check against a countermajoritarian judiciary.  Alternatively, impeachment or
its threat might help discipline adjudicators to secure amendments by judicial fiat with-
out the need for the formal process.  Thus, for example, rather than ratify the Equal
Rights Amendment, create judicial majorities—through appointment and selective
impeachment—who are willing to interpret the Equal Protection Clause to require
the same results.205  Rather than ratify an Equal Protection Clause that applies to the
national government, retain those Justices that “reverse” incorporate it by judicial fiat.206
Impeachment as judicial selection may even claim a democratic pedigree superior
to appointment.  Impeachment, unlike appointment, is a function of the House of
Representatives.207  This more numerous body has the strongest democratic mandate,
elected as it is every two years in proportion to population.208  The Senate, by contrast,
is relatively insulated with its six-year staggered terms and bias for sparsely populated
states.209  By initiating a judicial “deselection” process, the more democratic House
can force the Senate to accountability.
B. Arguments Against Impeachment as Judicial Selection
1. Constitutional Text
Defenders will respond that Congress may not employ impeachment as a tool to
ideologically deselect federal judges.  They may attempt to make the strong claim that
impeachment extends only to criminal offenses.  This argument relies principally on
textual arguments.  The Impeachment Grounds Clause limits the permissible basis
for removal from office to “Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery,
or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”210  Article III, section 3 narrowly defines
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“treason” as “consist[ing] only in levying War against [the United States], or in adher-
ing to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.”211  The First Congress codified the
definition of “bribery” with resort to its well-known common law definition as a judge’s
acceptance of money, “or any other bribe,” to influence judgment in a case.212  Neither
ground could be used to deselect jurisprudential enemies, except where members of
Congress fortuitously discover their opponent to have committed treason or have par-
ticipated in bribery, or at least engaged in conduct suggestive of those crimes.213
Proponents of ideological impeachment as constitutional hardball, therefore, must
assert the woolly catchall category of “other high Crimes and Misdemeanors” as the
ground for deselection.  The context of the catchall category, however, suggests a
more limited reading.  “[H]igh Crimes and Misdemeanors” is best interpreted in con-
text, noscitur a sociis, with other words “of the same kind,” ejusdem generis.214  The
words immediately preceding “high Crimes and Misdemeanor” are “Treason” and
“Bribery,” which are serious indictable crimes.  This usage allows the reasonable in-
ference that the Framers “remained focused on the common attribute” of indictable
criminality when employing the general words “other high Crimes.”215  Accordingly,
the text suggests that Congress should construe “other high Crimes” to apply only to
indictable criminal conduct of the same general nature or kind as treason and bribery.
To be sure, a misdemeanor was understood to be an “offence; ill behaviour; something
less than an atrocious crime.”216  If “Misdemeanor” is understood in its usual sense
rather than as a legal term of art, it may allow the impeachable conduct to be a less
serious offense, but still a criminal one.
Moreover, intratextually, other clauses in the Constitution may be read to cate-
gorize impeachable offenses as a subset of indictable crimes.  The Criminal Jury Trial
Clause provides that “[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury.”217  The Clause’s jury trial right for “all Crimes” extends only to
criminal offenses; that cases of impeachment are a subset suggests that they too are
criminal in nature.  Similarly, the Pardon Clause grants to the President “Power to
grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases
of Impeachment.”218  Again, the pardon power, which extends only to criminal
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“Offences against the United States,” treats impeachment as a subset of offenses
exempt from its operation.219
Reasonable persons at the Federal Convention indicated that the language “other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors” was not understood as an open-ended invitation to
impeach on any ground that Congress fancied, or for that matter, political offenses
not of a criminally indictable nature.  George Mason proposed that the Impeachment
Grounds Clause include the broad term “maladministration” after treason and bribery
as enumerated bases for impeachment.220  He expressed concern that the categories of
treason and bribery were too narrow and did not capture the corruption allegations that
formed the basis for the contemporaneous English impeachment inquiry into Warren
Hastings.221  James Madison, however, objected to the term “maladministration.”222
He cited the possibility that the Senate, with its right to try impeachments, might inter-
pret the term too broadly and thereby subordinate the President (or any other officer,
for that matter) to it.223  “So vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during pleasure
of the Senate.”224  Focusing on the particular office of President (and not considering
the situation of life tenured judges), Gouverneur Morris thought the term would do
no harm because the regular remedy of election every four years would prevent mal-
administration.225  George Mason, however, revised his original proposal and instead
substituted the phrase “other high Crimes and Misdemeanors against the State,” which
was adopted.226  This exchange reinforces the plain meaning that “other high crimes
and misdemeanors” is not a broad catchall but is cabined in its potential reach.227
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What should be made of the broad characterizations of the scope of “other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors” in English common law, Federalist No. 81, the state rati-
fying conventions, and the First Congress?  The broadest of these characterizations
would extend to nonindictable offenses where an officer engaged in a “wilful mistake
of the heart” as opposed to a “fault of the head.”228  Defenders might begin by noting
the large number of opinions supporting the conclusion that the giving of an “opinion”
was not grounds for impeachment.229  They might follow those citations with the rea-
sonable explanation that some commentators failed to read the Impeachment Clause’s
language in the context of American separated powers.  Joseph Story’s survey of
English impeachments led him to conclude that “many offences, not easily definable
by law, and many of purely political character, have been deemed high crimes and mis-
demeanors worthy of this extraordinary remedy.”230  But the United States, unlike
England, embraced a trinity of separated powers.  In an English parliamentary system,
it is not alien to allow impeachment for any number of offenses.231  No matter how
broad, they could not tread on the separation of powers in such a unitary system.  In
an American system, however, such broad understandings of the impeachment power
would permit the legislative power to swallow the judicial power.
2. Structure
Structurally, an interpretation of the Impeachment Clauses that permits ideological
deselection potentially allows the limited, cross-branch check of impeachment to
swallow the separation of powers.  The Article I, II, and III vesting clauses grant the
legislative, executive, and judicial powers, respectively, to separate departments of
government.232  This basic plan of organization, to which impeachment is only a limited
exception, aimed to limit the possibility of tyranny by dividing powers among dif-
ferent political actors.  If Congress were capable of exercising broad removal power
over the judiciary, beyond the limited grounds provided, it would raise the specter of
legislative control of the judicial function.233  The capacity to remove is a potent tool
for control234 and as discretionary power to remove becomes broader, so too does
the potency of control.
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Similarly, a claim that the Good Behaviour Clause provides a more exacting
standard for impeaching judges is inconsistent with the separation of powers.  Thus,
Congress could come to control the exercise of executive and judicial power by virtue
of its control of executive and judicial officers.  Instead, from a separation-of-powers
perspective, the Clause is best understood as either a shorthand cross-reference to the
usual grounds for impeachment or else an entirely different and separate mechanism
for removal in which the judiciary polices and removes its own members.235
3. Post-ratification Historical Practice
To defend against the constitutional hardball, defenders rely on the most famous
judicial impeachment precedent: the failed attempt to impeach Justice Chase on the
basis of his courtroom conduct and Federalist political ideology.236  The judiciary and
legal establishment cite the Chase impeachment as an inviolable super-precedent.
It stands for the proposition that “a judge’s judicial acts may not serve as a basis for
impeachment.”237  The naked partisan attempt to impeach Chase was defeated, and
defenders emphasize the outcome rather than the closeness of the vote.238
Unlike Pickering before him, Chase was capable of carrying out the duties of
his office.  Pickering suffered from an indisputable incapacity to fulfill the duties of
his office.239  To be sure, he was a target for Democratic-Republicans.240  Pickering’s
ideological impeachment, however, was stealthy and not expressly on account of his
party affiliation.
Supporters of ideological impeachment might rely on prior impeachments and
convictions, for example those of Judges Robert Archbald and Halsted Ritter, which
appeared to rely on nonindictable grounds.  In Judge Archbald’s case, commentators
have characterized his removal as predicated upon nonindictable conduct.241  Although
the impeachment articles did not explicitly charge bribery or name a particular indict-
able offense, Congress described a pattern of conduct with a very strong whiff of quid-
pro-quo bribery and extortion of litigants appearing before him.242  The repeated theme
throughout his articles of impeachment is litigants appeared before Archbald, and he
extracted special business favors from those litigants.243  Given the uncertainty of
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the prescribed evidentiary standard for impeachment,244 Congress might have sub
silentio impeached Archbald for bribery without specifying it.  It might have strongly
suspected further undetected evidence of explicitly criminal conduct.245
In Judge Halsted Ritter’s case, Congress predicated his impeachment conviction
upon what might seem to be a nonindictable offense.  Of the seven articles against
him, Ritter was convicted on the seventh article by a single vote and acquitted on all
others, which involved criminal malfeasance in office.246  That article provided he
was being impeached because his judicial conduct brought his court “into scandal
and disrepute.”247  Specifically, Ritter had explicitly conditioned a ruling to recuse
himself in a case upon the City of Miami taking action favorable to him outside of
court, viz., passing a resolution expressing its confidence in Ritter.248
Although defenders arguing for narrow impeachment grounds might have dif-
ficulty maintaining that the article was only for indictable criminal conduct (even if
there was arguably a quid pro quo offer to exchange a ruling for something valuable
to the judge), it is clear what was not at issue in Ritter: Congress was not asserting that
Ritter had decided a case incorrectly through an act of judicial activism, or even the
selection of an incorrect interpretive methodology exercised in good faith, etc.
In any case, the application of the Ritter or Archbald “precedents” or any of these
other non-judicial cases is objectionable for reasons beyond their applicability.  Unlike
a judicial precedent, no single voice speaks for the House or Senate authoritatively or
clearly.  These non-judicial precedents, even more so than judicial precedents, are sus-
ceptible to multiple and inconsistent characterization.  In an impeachment, no majority
opinion limits the precedential effect by stating a holding.  The rationale for particular
outcomes is indiscernible.249  The four corners of an article of impeachment and the
vote indicate an outcome.  The outcome is a Spartan civilian announcement of a
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case outcome rather than a common law opinion providing a ratio decidendi.  More-
over, the softness of impeachment’s political stare decisis means that the Senate has
no effective mechanism for overruling an aberrant prior case’s potential precedential
effect.  Over time, the result will be a loosening of the grounds for impeachment.  That
is, there could be ten cases where impeachment on a nonindictable offense was not
permitted, but a single instance where it is.  That one case, which arguably ignored the
other “precedents,” now displaces the ten prior cases by creating a precedent that may
be cited in preference to the others and in favor of broader congressional prerogative.
Thus, disputants may pick impeachment precedents they prefer and ignore the others.
Defenders of narrow grounds for removal will argue that past impeachment pro-
ceedings, such as Ritter’s case, do not merit the acquiescence of the other branches—at
least to the extent they suggest the impeachability of nonindictable conduct.  Although
Justice Frankfurter allowed that “[d]eeply embedded traditional ways of conducting
government . . . give meaning to the words of a text or supply them,” he doubted that
“three isolated instances” could “add up, either in number, scope, duration or contem-
poraneous legal justification” to such a construction.250  Further, it is unclear whether
Justice Frankfurter’s acquiescence analysis ought to apply.  Unlike legislation, impeach-
ment is not a two-branch proceeding where another branch even has the opportunity
and capacity to resist the intrusion of another branch.  If Congress were to decide unilat-
erally that its impeachment power reached executive or judicial conduct it considered
undesirable, the other branches would have no resort to a veto or other mechanism
to fight the power grab.
4. Purpose
Defenders of narrow grounds for impeachment will argue that the purpose of the
impeachment power is not the promotion of the democratic process by allowing the
removal of officers who might issue rulings at odds with transient majorities.  The
impeachment power constitutes only a limited exception to the usual separation of
powers for the purpose of removing officers in enumerated circumstances.
It would be a slippery slope to allow impeachment to extend to so-called “political
offenses.”  Such offenses could reach good faith reasoning expressed in judicial work
product that opponents find objectionable.  Even assuming all reasonable jurists
agreed that there is only one fixed, knowable, best interpretation of each provision
of the Constitution to resolve ambiguity (and most do not), many originalists would
acknowledge that adjudication also involves the separate act of construction to re-
solve the problem of vagueness.251  As such, even stringent methodological adherence
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to the most formal models of adjudication leaves leeway for discretion.  The exercise
of this discretion, in turn, may become an opponent’s hook for impeachment.  After
all, reversal on the basis of discretion is considered “an abuse of discretion.”  There
really is no limiting principle between what might fairly be characterized a political
offense from judicial usurpation of legislative prerogative.  It is a small matter to say
that a decision with which one disagrees is “activist” and impeachable.
Professor Gerhardt argues that the Constitution’s vesting of the sole power to
try in the Senate, an elected body, means the Framers intended impeachment to be a
political process, and not a legal one.252  The Federal Convention record does not sup-
port such a claim.  First, the Convention members initially contemplated vesting the
trial of impeachments in the Supreme Court as yet another enumerated ground for
federal court jurisdiction.253  This power was not removed from the Court and placed
with the Senate because the character of the legal proceeding was being reconstituted
as a political one.  There was no discussion of any felt need that impeachment needed
to be a “political” proceeding.  Instead, the reason given was a concern that the Court
was to be “too few in number and might be warped or corrupted” more easily than
a numerous body and that it might have a conflict of interest if called upon to impeach
a President because judges are presidentially appointed.254  Other delegates expressed
that if impeachment were to be tried in the judiciary, judges might “be drawn into in-
trigues with the Legislature and an impartial trial would be frustrated.”255  Ironi-
cally, at least for some, the concern for an impartial trial motivated the reassignment
of the impeachment trial to the Senate.
Further, the Constitution requires that senators trying an impeachment “shall be
on Oath or Affirmation.”256  What is the meaning of being under the oath?  Gouverneur
Morris characterized the oath as a safeguard against senators untruthfully concluding
that a crime had been committed or finding that a state of affairs was the case, when
it was not.257  “[T]here could be no danger that the Senate would say untruly on their
oaths that the President was guilty of crimes or facts, especially as in four years he can
be turned out.”258  Morris recognized that the appeal to high motives (e.g., honoring
an oath) might need to be tempered with an acknowledgment of low ones, i.e., the
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pragmatic motive that lying would be unnecessary given the regular republican
remedy of election.  This oath taking is consistent with the extensive practice of the
Senate referring to itself as a “court” of impeachment.259
Second, impeachment is “political” in the sense that legislators are elected rep-
resentatives, but the proceeding is not “political” in the sense that there are no legal
standards and that it could be a free-ranging inquiry into political offenses.  Of course,
legislators could engage in the impeachment equivalent of jury bias (a non-merits
conviction) or jury nullification (a non-merits acquittal).  Every criminal trial in
America is “political” in this sense.  But that does not imply there are no controlling
legal standards.
IV. THE GROWING RISK OF IMPEACHMENT AS JUDICIAL SELECTION
Notwithstanding the temptation of deselection, impeachment has historically been
cumbersome and its ideological use circumscribed.  If that were not the case, would
not legislators have resorted to it more frequently than they have?  One English ob-
server likened it to a “hundred-ton gun” that is “so heavy it is unfit for ordinary use”
and “which needs complex machinery to bring it into position, an enormous charge
of powder to fire it, and a large mark to aim at.”260  The description is apt.  Tradi-
tionally, impeachment has had many hedges about it including the necessity of bi-
cameral action, the requirement of a supermajority vote to convict, its limited and
enumerated grounds for invocation, and the legalistic procedural inefficiency and
resultant opportunity cost.261
The risk that this strategy might become more commonplace, however, is grow-
ing.  The confluence of several constitutional and political developments has lowered
these traditional barriers to impeachment while simultaneously raising them to trans-
formative appointment, the chief alternative.  This section elaborates the changes afoot
that might transform the traditional preference for appointment over impeachment.
Although the two “selection” tools are not substitutes, the remaining obstacles may
be eroded as ongoing changes bring the two mechanisms to equilibrium.
A. The Necessity of Bicameral Action
1. Lowering the Bar to Impeachment: The Loss of Intra-legislative Division
The Framers divided the impeachment power across two legislative chambers to
safeguard against its abuse, providing “a complete security” against Congress retaliating
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against the judiciary.262  By “assigning to one [chamber] the right of accusing, to the
other the right of judging, [the Constitution] avoids the inconvenience of making the
same persons both accusers and judges.”263  The theory was that the popularly elected
House would impeach or indict with a simple majority, while the more deliberative
Senate would adjudge and convict with a two-thirds supermajority.264  This division of
labor resulted in cautious deliberation—an internal checking function—as both bodies,
selected by different constituencies, would have to agree to convict and remove.265
Senators answered to their state legislatures and reflected their partisan divisions.266
They were relatively insulated and thought to be the “well-educated, wealthier, more
virtuous citizens.”267  They were neither accountable directly to interest groups nor
dependent on their campaign largesse for expensive direct election campaigns.268  In
contrast, the directly elected House responded to popular passion.269  It represented
parochial interests that were thought to be “more subject to factions and more inclined
than the Senate to hasty and intemperate action.”270  By dividing the impeachment
power between the two chambers, the Framers pitted the Senate against the House,
two chambers elected by, and representing, different constituencies.
The governmental engineering generally worked.  Different constituencies elected
Senators than elected their House counterparts: state legislatures elected Senators;271
individual voters elected House Representatives.272  The result was that the House and
Senate majorities were occasionally divided one against the other.273  Bicameralism
thereby provided a cooling function, with the republican Senate thought to act as a
“cooling saucer” for the democratic passion of the House.274
However, the direct election of U.S. senators, formalized and mandated by the
Seventeenth Amendment,275 diminished this internal check.  Direct election provided
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for the same constituencies—individual voters—to elect the House and the Senate.276
This identity of electors meant, in turn, that there was an increased likelihood of
alignment in partisan preference (and control) across legislative chambers.  Thus,
there is less deliberative cooling and a greater risk of united partisan exercise of
power with those functions that are divided between chambers, such as legislating
and impeachment.
Indeed, control of the two chambers now generally moves in lockstep.  Since
direct election of the Senate began in 1914, the same political party has controlled
both chambers of Congress with only the rare exception.277  Direct election of senators
has reduced intra-legislative division.  Majority control of the chambers now gener-
ally moves in tandem, except notably when there is a post-election party defection,
resignation, or death.278
The increased likelihood of legislative unity now means that it is easier for a
House and Senate controlled by the same party to impeach (i.e., indict), try, and con-
vict.  Bicameral coordination by political confederates is easier and may result in less
deliberation and more convictions.
2. Raising the Appointments Bar: More Inter-branch Division
At the same time that impeachment as judicial selection has become marginally
easier for Congress, transformative appointment has become more difficult for
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Presidents as they are more likely to confront divided government than their prede-
cessors.  Political scientists have observed that, notwithstanding the present unity
of government, we live in a period where inter-branch divided government—i.e., a
President and a Congress held by different parties—is a regularly occurring feature
of the political landscape.279  During the last fifty-six years, there has been President-
Senate division in fourteen out of twenty-nine congresses, or almost fifty percent of
the time.280  That frequency contrasts with the relative non-occurrence of President-
Senate division prior to the election of 1952.281  During the 163-year period from 1789
to 1952, President-Senate division occurred only nine times or eleven percent of the
time.282  Whatever the causes, today a nominating President more frequently encounters
a confirming Senate controlled by an opposing party.
These judicial nominations during periods of divided government are less likely
to prove transformative.  Either the nominations process will prove particularly con-
tentious or a President will obligatorily, in order to secure confirmation, moderate his
choices.283  For example, the confirmation hearings of Robert Bork, Clarence Thomas,
the post-1994 election Clinton nominees, and the post-2006 election George W. Bush
nominees were particularly contentious.284  In such cases, it is unlikely any appoint-
ment would prove transformative.  This is not to say a President could resort to im-
peachment as an alternative selection tool during divided government—that would
place the process in the hands of political opponents and render the President relatively
impuissant.  It does, however, suggest that a united Congress gains an improved hand
in judicial selection, relative to the President, when government is divided, at least
with respect to transformative appointment.
B. Supermajority Requirement
Impeachment as judicial selection also requires larger majorities than appointment.
The process requires not only a simple House majority to impeach, but also a two-
thirds Senate supermajority, or sixty-seven votes in the presently constituted hundred-
senator chamber, to convict.285  In contrast, appointment requires a simple Senate
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majority to confirm.286  The use of the filibuster against the confirmation of judicial
nominees, however, has raised the bar to transformative appointments at the same
time that barriers to impeachment have been lowered.
1. Raising the Bar to Appointment
Transformative appointments to the courts have become more difficult as
senators have deployed procedural tools to thwart simple majority rule.  First, the
use of Senate filibusters to block judicial confirmation votes has made transforma-
tive appointments more difficult.  A filibuster is a senator’s ability to obstruct legis-
lative action, typically by wielding the traditional privilege to engage in unlimited
and (thereby) dilatory speech.287  Ordinarily, a vote to confirm requires only a simple
majority vote, or presently fifty-one senators.  But when a senator decides to filibuster
a confirmation, he or she may block a vote absent a successful supermajority vote
to invoke the limitation of debate, or cloture.288  Senate Rule 22 defines that super-
majority as three-fifths of senators “duly chosen and sworn,” or in a complete com-
plement of the presently constituted Senate, sixty senators.289
Filibusters have become increasingly commonplace as a senator’s tool of choice
for obstruction.  Once upon a time, filibustering carried heavy costs, both the phys-
ical exertion of holding the floor290 and the foregone opportunity to engage in other
legislative activity.291  The modern filibuster, however, is “virtually costless.”292
Majorities short of sixty senators are unwilling to “engage in wars of attrition and
incur the attendant [opportunity] costs,” thereby rendering “filibustering costless for
minorities.”293  The multi-tracking system devised by Senators Robert Byrd and Mike
Mansfield exemplifies this unwillingness to challenge filibusters.294  The multi-track
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system obviates the need for a filibustering senator to hold the floor.  An obstructed
measure is “moved” to a separate track, thereby enabling other legislative action and
lessening collateral damage to the Senate’s work.295
This preference for the filibuster extends to judicial nominations.  Where oppo-
nents perceive an appointment to be high stakes, such as when it may transform a col-
legial court or prelude such an appointment, a filibuster is an almost costless and low
visibility way to scuttle an appointment, particularly when used against lower court
nominees.296  Both Senate Democrats and Republicans have wielded this procedural
weapon to block confirmation votes for transformative nominees to the U.S. courts
of appeals and U.S. Supreme Court.297
The use of judicial filibusters narrows the gap between appointment and impeach-
ment and makes the two selection tools closer substitutes.  When comparing appoint-
ment and impeachment as competing selection strategies, ideological impeachment
most appropriately compares with transformative appointment disputes, not run-of-
the-mill appointments.  These appointments most likely would incite a minority’s use
of the filibuster.298  Impeachments, used as judicial selection, would likely be reserved
for attempts at transforming a collegial court.  While there is a gap between the two
methods to choosing judges, the difference between impeachment and a transformative
appointment is not quite the chasm one may imagine.299  The real distance is not the
sixteen-vote span between a sixty-seven-vote supermajority to convict an incumbent
jurist and the fifty-one-vote simple majority to confirm a nominee; it is the seven-vote
span between the sixty-seven-vote supermajority necessary to convict and the sixty-
vote supermajority required to invoke cloture to a filibuster.300
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Second, the Senate tradition of “blue slips” enables senators to delay or block
transformative judicial appointments to federal judgeships.301  Although formally the
President retains the power to nominate judges, senators effectively control the nomi-
nation of those judges from their states.  The “blue slip” senatorial courtesy authorizes
a senator to place a hold on a judicial nominee from his or her home state, whether a
district court judge or a circuit judge, whose seat is traditionally allotted to a particular
state.302  If a senator returns a “blue slip” on a nomination marked “objection,” a full
committee hearing on the nomination may not go forward.303  Thus, this hold permits
a senator to veto a judicial nominee of whom he or she does not approve.  To be sure,
the “blue slip” tradition has recently come under reconsideration (or at least revi-
sion),304 and a senator could attempt to release a nomination from committee by way
of a discharge motion.305  But in light of senatorial comity, it is neither likely the “blue
slip” will disappear entirely nor that discharge petitions will become commonplace.
2. Lowering the Bar to Impeachment
Unlike appointment, which must be consummated to achieve its end, impeach-
ment does not need to actually culminate in conviction and removal to be effective as
an instrument of deselection.  A supermajority vote to convict may prove altogether
unnecessary.  If the judge resigns office prior to trial in the Senate, a simple House
majority suffices to “impeach” as a tool of judicial selection.306  In such cases, re-
moval would be easier to obtain than transformative appointment: the House, unlike
the Senate, does not permit filibusters or senatorial holds.  The Impeachment Clause
requires only a bare House majority.307  That bare majority may also act precipitously
and with only a minimal amount of evidence heard.  Indeed, “the House now seems
comfortable in disposing of its obligation to accuse rather promptly.  It may, in fact,
now discharge its duties as accuser too quickly and too easily, acting much like a grand
jury that simply rubber stamps the presentation of the prosecutor with an indictment.”308
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As a result, impeachment, like appointment, may have a “silent operation.”309
A successful impeachment vote alone, or even a colorable threat of a successful im-
peachment vote, may have a potent in terrorem effect that makes completion of the
impeachment process unnecessary and pressures targeted jurists to resign.310  Judges
may fear running the impeachment gauntlet for a combination of many reasons: nega-
tive publicity and harm to their reputations;311 unreimbursed legal defense bills;312 the
possible revelation of further humiliating and embarrassing information;313 the un-
covering of more legally consequential missteps;314 the loss of pensions if impeached
and convicted;315 altruistic concern for political damage to the judiciary as an institution
(or at least lip service to that altruism);316 the inevitability of impeachment itself;317 and
the ability to be pardoned for ordinary criminal conduct but not impeachment.318  If
a judge sufficiently fears the consequences of formal impeachment and removal, even
if innocent, he or she may voluntarily resign.319  The Senate’s supermajority vote then
proves unnecessary, and thus the impeachment process, or at least its threat, becomes
a closer alternative to appointment.
Simply counting formally impeached and convicted judges results in a gross under-
count of the tool’s potency.  It neglects the many who resigned when in impeachment’s
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shadow.320  Although only seven federal judges have been both impeached and con-
victed, almost four times as many have resigned under its shadow.321  These cases
constitute a crypto-history of impeachment that has escaped inclusion in the tradi-
tional canon.  What has been characterized as impeachment’s “disuse” may simply be
the evidence of its shadow’s success.322
Prominent among these resignations was Justice Fortas.  President Richard Nixon
had campaigned for the presidency by running against the Warren Court, advocating
law and order, and promising to appoint “strict constructionists who saw their duty
as interpreting law and not making law.”323  To transform the Court, however, Nixon
would require several appointments beyond the seat of Chief Justice Earl Warren.324
Fortas provided a convenient target for judicial deselection when Life journalist William
Lambert picked up the trail of a rumor that Fortas had financial dealings with convicted
securities manipulator Louis Wolfson.325  Although commentators opine that he likely
broke no law,326 he resigned under pressure from the Nixon administration, Congress,
and the media.327  His resignation eliminated a jurist ideologically distant from Nixon
and allowed Nixon an opportunity for another appointment.
To be sure, it is easier to precipitate resignations from jurists who have actually
broken the law, or who have otherwise engaged in politically or ethically questionable
conduct.  Judges have resigned after a criminal conviction without any House vote of
impeachment328 and others have resigned after House impeachment alone.329  Criminal
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wrongdoing by a judge that a President may investigate and prosecute prior to im-
peachment surely assists in precipitating resignations.330
But resignation is not strictly necessary.  A naked threat of impeachment may
have the effect of disciplining adjudication even absent in terrorem resignation.
“[T]he prospect of occasional impeachments could greatly increase accountability.”331
Indeed, impeachment may be “more potent in its threat than in its practice.”332  Con-
sider the analogous case of President Franklin Roosevelt’s court-packing plan.333  FDR
did not actually carry out his infamous plan.  Still, Justice Owen Roberts’s alleged
“switch-in-time that saved nine” may evidence the possibility of in terrorem disci-
pline.334  Such brushbacks may domesticate jurists without the need to remove them.335
Notwithstanding the smaller seven-vote gap between impeachment and closing
filibuster debate on a transformative appointment, seven votes can still make the dif-
ference between removal and continued incumbency.  Several proposals to change the
numbers of votes to confirm might have the unwitting effect of incentivizing impeach-
ment against now-incumbent judges or Justices.  For example, Professor John Ferejohn
has suggested amending the Constitution to require a Senate supermajority to confirm
an appointee.336  He reasons that the requirement “would mean that newly appointed
judges would have to be acceptable across party and ideological lines.  This would
tend to discourage the appointment of ideologically extreme judges and would prob-
ably tend to lead to a court filled with judicial moderates.”337  This outcome results
from the need to capture the votes of a larger number of senators spanning a broader
ideological spectrum.  If the formalization of a supermajority were to raise the con-
firmation requirement above that already required for cloture to sixty-seven votes,
then, at least as vote count is concerned, it would be no more trouble to secure judicial
deselection through impeachment than to secure transformative appointment.  Im-
peachment would be more tempting because of its advantages as a backward looking
tool that benefits from hindsight.  Although such a proposal might make it less likely
that impeachment would be employed prospectively to deselect jurists (on the theory
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that ex ante information was adequate to allow informed voting that reflected sen-
atorial ideological preferences), it might have a different effect for existing court
members.  For these jurists, in terms of vote counting, it would be no more difficult
to appoint a transformative replacement than to remove an incumbent.
C. Its Limited Grounds for Invocation
The limited grounds for impeachment have traditionally formed another obstacle
to the congressional invocation of impeachment.  Treason, bribery, and other high
crimes and misdemeanors define the universe of impeachable conduct.  Although these
grounds sound in the criminal law and suggest criminally indictable conduct, or at least
serious noncriminal political offenses, Congress has at least once in the past impeached
and convicted a judicial officer for nonindictable conduct.338  Moreover, as Part III
previously described, Article III’s “good Behaviour” language can be interpreted non-
frivolously to articulate a higher standard of conduct for judges, such that conduct
short of a high crime or misdemeanor might serve as a hook for impeachment.339
Moreover, partisan impeachments have occasionally succeeded.  There is a rela-
tionship between partisan affiliation and votes to convict/acquit in the impeachment
trials of Judge Ritter in 1936 (all counts) and Judge Archbald in 1913 (counts 4, 7, 8,
and 9).340  Alexander Hamilton recognized the potential danger that “the comparative
strength of parties” might prove more important than “the real demonstrations of inno-
cence or guilt.”341  Still, it will not be often that partisan impeachment attempts succeed.
The Court’s holding that impeachment might be broadly nonjusticiable further
lowers the impeachment bar.  In Walter Nixon v. United States, the Court held it to
be a nonjusticiable political question whether the Senate trial procedure violated the
Impeachment Trial Clause.342  At issue was Senate Impeachment Rule XI, which per-
mitted a subset of the Senate to receive evidence and hear arguments and then to pre-
pare a report for the rest of the body.343  The Senate would then rely on the report to
make its determination whether to convict or not.  The Senate found Walter Nixon
guilty and convicted him.344  Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, placed
significant weight on the Impeachment Trial Clause’s language that it granted the
Senate “the sole power to try all impeachments.”  The words “sole power” constituted
“a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue” of impeachment
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“to a coordinate political department.”345  As such, the Senate became the final arbiter
of what procedure the Impeachment Trial Clause required.  In addition, Rehnquist
concluded that, as a structural matter, the Court ought not to interfere with one of
the few checks-and-balances available to discipline the judiciary.346  If the Court
could exercise its powers of judicial review to strike down an impeachment convic-
tion, then it could thwart one of the few checks against the judiciary available to the
political branches.
Although Nixon concerned only the Senate’s power over trial procedure, its
rationale also supports a maximalist reading that what constitutes an impeachable
offense is also nonjusticiable.347  Significantly, the Constitution similarly commits to
the House the “sole Power of Impeachment.”348  Court review of the House’s power
could interfere with this congressional check-and-balance against the judiciary.  In
Ritter v. United States, which pre-dated Nixon, the Court of Claims concluded that
whether nonindictable conduct constituted grounds for removal was a nonjusticiable
political question.349  Nixon’s rationale strengthens the likelihood that the Court would
agree that the grounds for impeachment are not subject to judicial review.  The result
is that the Senate’s “interpretation is final and unreviewable by the courts.”350
This nonjusticiability means that Congress enjoys broader latitude to impeach,
at least as a legal matter.  A host of complaints could be characterized as an abuse of
judicial power.351  Indeed, the Framers may have countenanced the availability of im-
peachment for the liberal (i.e., generous) reading of statutes and constitutional pro-
visions—conduct they anticipated would be exceptional rather than commonplace.352
Granted, prevailing political norms dictate that Congress not impeach as a recall
mechanism.  These norms might result from several considerations.  First, the act of
hiring and firing are asymmetric due to a sense in which an office-holder is entitled to
continue holding office.  This sentiment might result from a legislator perceiving the
office as something to which the office-holder is entitled.  That is, senators might
regret that they had ever consented to the appointment of a particular office-holder, but
they would not act now to impeach.  Second, the deselection of tenured judges might
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be disfavored in a congressional body trained (in large part) as lawyers and who have
traditionally been professionally obligated to defend, and not to criticize the courts.353
Third, legislators might appreciate that impeachment as a recall mechanism could lead
to reciprocal tit-for-tat retaliation against appointees of the legislator’s party once
political winds inevitably change.354
But if there are such “norms” about the proper uses of impeachment—assuming
they can even exist with respect to a procedure so rarely invoked—they are mutable
over time, much in the same way that the norms for judicial appointment have changed
over time.355  Moreover, Congress can remove bias from behavioral asymmetries by
pre-committing itself to certain courses of conduct.  For example, it might choose to
codify particular conduct as “impeachable,” particularly if jurisprudential opponents
are more likely to undertake it.356  Such pre-commitments would not limit congres-
sional discretion to impeach, but they do legitimate a future congressional judgment
of instances in which the impeachment power is appropriate.
D. Procedural Inefficiency
1. Raising the Barrier to Appointment
The last century of appointments witnessed a tremendous growth in the process
and time surrounding nomination and confirmation.  The Senate initially held no
public hearings on judicial nominees.  By 1916, the Senate held hearings for Louis
Brandeis but without his being present.357  In 1925, Harlan Fiske Stone appeared at his
own insistence and the hearing, contrary to usual practice, was opened to the public.358
By 1950, the Senate Judiciary Committee asked all nominees to the Court to appear.359
Interest groups increasingly testified during the hearings for and against the confirma-
tion of particular nominees.360  Accompanying media and “grassroots” campaigns in
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key senators’ states have made the process increasingly resemble political campaigns
for elective office.361
As part of the modern nomination process, the Office of White House Counsel
and the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel screen and interview prospective
nominees to the courts.362  Following the appointment of Chief Justice Earl Warren,
the FBI had conducted background and security checks on nominees to the Court,363
and, until March 2001364 and again since January 2009,365 the ABA evaluated prospec-
tive nominees pre-nomination.  In addition, once nominated, judges, especially Justices,
participate in a confirmation campaign that often begins with a ceremonial nomination
at the White House for nominees to the Circuit and Supreme Courts.366  For Supreme
Court nominees, the process involves meeting every U.S. Senator who may vote on
the confirmation;367 participating in preparatory “murder boards”;368 and withstanding
scrutiny during multi-day televised confirmation hearings.369  Then the confirmation
goes to a vote following debate, subject to the possibility of filibuster.370
As a consequence of the foregoing, the time required to appoint a judge has grown
longer and longer.  During the 105th Congress, it took on average 205 days from nomi-
nation to confirm a federal judge.371  By comparison, it took only an average of 14.5
days to confirm a federal judge during the 82nd Congress.372  From 1947 to 1998, the
average time from nomination to confirmation was 92 days.373  Moreover, in comparing
appointment and impeachment, it is important to distinguish the transformative from
the run of the mill.  Transformative appointments may result in filibusters and blue slip
holds that delay or block confirmation altogether.374  Appointment to a swing vote seat
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on a collegial court will likely consume more Senate time than a status quo appoint-
ment, for example, to the district courts.  Further, if the judge is well qualified and the
appointment viewed as transformative, it may precipitate opposition and delay.375
2. Lowering the Bar to Impeachment: Increasing Efficiency
The time and effort required to impeach create another obstacle to the use of
impeachment.  Impeachment has been called the “hundred-ton gun” partially in rec-
ognition of how slowly its machinery operates.376  A determined House majority may
vote articles of impeachment with relative dispatch.377  The Senate, however, acting as
a trial court, may take much longer to admit the evidence, weigh it, and hear argument
of counsel.378
Senate Rule XI for impeachment proceedings, however, has streamlined the pro-
cess relative to prior trial practice by authorizing the use of subdelegation.  The Senate
subdelegates to a committee of senators the tasks of trying the impeachment, namely,
receiving evidence, hearing argument of counsel, and recommending a course of
action.379  Acting on an impeachment no longer consumes the Senate’s undivided
attention by requiring trial by the full body.380  After the subcommittee proceedings,
the full Senate—with opportunity for debate—votes whether to convict.381  Thus, post-
Rule XI, impeachment resembles the Senate’s delegation of nominations matters to
the Senate Judiciary Committee: after hearings and consideration of testimony, the
Committee recommends action to the full Senate; following the recommendation,
the full Senate may debate the matter and vote to appoint.  The process still takes longer
than a contested confirmation hearing, but proposals for reform might shorten the
process further.382
Nixon has liberated the Senate to consider a broad array of novel trial procedures
that would expedite impeachment.  For example, issue preclusion in impeachment
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would trim the expense and effort involved in trying impeachments.  Also, the Senate
at present not only makes the judgment to convict; it must hear the House impeach-
ment managers develop the factual record.383  But if a factual record were created
during a prior successful criminal prosecution or judicial investigation, this latter task
needlessly duplicates that which a federal judge and jury have already determined.384
The prosecuting House Managers would invoke issue preclusion—non-mutual offen-
sive collateral estoppel in impeachment—to prevent “relitigation” of the charge in the
Senate.385  The evidence of criminal conviction could serve as adequate evidence for
impeachment without requiring de novo development of the record.  Of course, the
Senate could refuse to rely on the prior conviction, vote not to convict on the basis of
criminal conviction, or establish a record of nonindictable conduct that might serve as
the basis for impeachment; but those senators who were willing to rely on conviction
to impeach could do so.
This approach would curb the time-consuming and redundant development of the
factual record and make the impeachment process more (ruthlessly) efficient and
speedy.  But assuming political opponents of judges have not been lucky enough to
uncover indictable conduct by their ideological targets, issue preclusion would be of
limited use as a tool of ideological selection.  Instead, issue preclusion would be of
greatest use in pursuing judges who were convicted for indictable conduct.  To be
sure, any factual finding from a prior criminal case that reflects poorly on a judge may
be helpful to an opponent in an impeachment proceeding.  But unless these discrete
findings are necessary elements of a criminal offense, it may be difficult to identify
what factual findings have been established in the prior prosecution.
Notwithstanding the movement toward a closer equilibrium, legislators have a
high opportunity cost in foregone legislative activity for taking the time to impeach.
Nixon, however, has given the Senate broad latitude for further procedural innovation.
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Subdelegation has already made impeachment more efficient and therefore more ex-
peditious.  Eventually, the limitation of issue scope might similarly hasten removal.
Finally, the Senate might curb the formality of its proceedings.  It could move away
from a legal model of a criminal trial with its thicket of evidentiary and procedural
safeguards toward a more informal approach, i.e., a political model that resembles a
Senate confirmation hearing.  Witnesses still testify under oath, legislators still examine
and cross-examine witnesses, but the committee dispenses with rules of evidence and
other procedural formalities.
V. THE TRAGEDY OF IMPEACHMENT AS JUDICIAL SELECTION
The choice to employ impeachment as judicial selection is not costless.  In par-
ticular, decisional independence and the rule of law suffer.  Part V briefly discusses
these costs and measures to avoid the constitutional hardball tactic, or at least mitigate
some of the harm.
A. The Cost of Impeachment as Judicial Selection
1. Decisional Independence
Impeachment used to deselect jurists on the basis of their work product or ideology
undermines decisional independence, which is the principal means by which adjudi-
cative impartiality is secured.  Although ideological appointment exerts pressure on
judicial nominees ex ante appointment (including nominees who might already be
sitting Article III judges who exercise the judicial power), ex post impeachment threats
permit political actors far greater opportunity to discipline judges.  The in terrorem
effect of impeachment—both in terrorem discipline and in terrorem resignation—
results in greater judicial deference to Congress.  That effect would tend to undermine
the countermajoritarian structure of judicial review.
Of course, Article III judicial independence as presently understood is not the only
model for decisional independence.  It is the minority approach to securing judicial
independence among American state court judges.  Four-fifths of the states retain an
ex post electoral check on their judges.386  Moreover, increasingly the process for
appointing federal judges, especially Supreme Court Justices, resembles a political
campaign for elected office.  There are media campaigns, fund-raising, organized pres-
sure groups, “grassroots” efforts, and the hurly-burly of politics as usual.387  In this
context, ideological impeachment looks somewhat like a republican version of that
democratic ex post electoral device, the recall petition.  Whether such a fundamental
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change, however, is desirable, it is not without its tradeoffs in lost adjudicative im-
partiality.  That tradeoff is properly the product of a formalizing amendment process
subject to democratic ratification by the usual Article V supermajorities.388
2. Rule of Law
An ideological selection process also has costs for the rule of law.  The rule of
law, defined here as the impartial adjudication of disputes by reference to rules and
standards articulated in advance, requires that similarly situated parties be treated
similarly without regard to their identities.389  The rules and standards should remain
predictably in force and change only in accordance with the rules for changing rules.
The identity of the adjudicator should matter little.  To the extent it matters, it should
principally influence construction, and not interpretation.390  The rule of law may be
undermined if political actors are able to use impeachment to obtain constitutional
amendment by judicial fiat rather than by resort to Article V’s amendment procedure.
Ideological impeachment, like ideological appointment, raises the concern that polit-
ical actors will attempt to revise the Constitution under the guise of interpretation.
Such changes will reflect the concerns and preoccupations of legal elites and not the
considered democratic input of supermajorities.
B. The Prevention of Impeachment as Judicial Selection
Given the costs of the tactic, planning for its prevention, or at least its mitigation,
is in order.  Although the hyperrealist genie animating the tactic is unlikely to be
rebottled, there is institutional insulation to help shield against it.
1. Appointment-Side Fixes
If the appointments-side problems are fixed, resort to impeachment as judicial
selection is less likely to occur on the back end.  Two proposals are in order.  First,
the nomination and confirmation processes need to generate better records about the
professionalism and ethics of nominees.  The Senate should reverse its prior practice
of presuming confirmation.391  It should presume non-confirmation or inaction.  Such
a presumption would create incentives for a President and his nominee to create a
record supporting confirmation.
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Second, Congress and the States should amend Article III to provide for fixed,
nonrenewable, lengthy terms on the Court.392  Such an amendment should stagger
these terms to avoid the usual holdout problems.  This proposal lowers the relative
stakes for each seat by making the Court appropriately responsive to the usual appoint-
ments process.
2. Impeachment-Side Fixes
Two impeachment-side fixes concern the grounds for impeachment and the costs
of defending against threats of impeachment.  First, as to the grounds for impeach-
ment, it is an open invitation to difficulties to entertain a strong form of Walter Nixon
political question nonjusticiability.  Only ambiguous nonjudicial precedents interpret
the scope of the capacious phrase “other high Crimes and misdemeanors.”  Given the
currency of realism and hyperrealism, legislators are almost entirely unconstrained in
their exercise of impeachment power.  A more modest reading of Walter Nixon—one
that extends the nonjusticiability only to House and Senate procedure, but not to the
particular grounds for removal—would more effectively backstop the power’s exercise.
Second, judicial officers are vulnerable to constitutional hardball tactics that in-
voke marginally colorable grounds for impeachment.  To reduce the in terrorem
effects of impeachment threats and inquiries, Congress might consider the reimburse-
ment of legal fees incurred in defending against judicial removal.  Alternatively,
Congress could authorize attorney fee shifting to allow jurists to be reimbursed their
fees and costs when they prevail.  Such a provision would diminish the likelihood that
opponents could use the threat of litigation costs to secure resignation.
CONCLUSION
This Article identified the phenomenon of impeachment as judicial selection as
a tactic of constitutional hardball.  Its persistent invocation suggests that the claims
supporting the phenomenon are unlikely to disappear.  Likely, this persistence reflects
the continued attraction of an ex post confirmation tool that would give the political
branches improved information about judges.  That information, coupled with the
capacity to initiate selection outside the judiciary, would grant Congress superior
control over the Court’s direction.
The justificatory task for this constitutional hardball is made easier by appeal
to the paramount functional need to check a countermajoritarian federal judiciary.
Counter-arguments defending the traditional reading of impeachment must rely prin-
cipally on claims about text and structure to overcome the inertia of ambiguous im-
peachment precedent.  This task is made all the more difficult by the related obstacle
of nonjusticiability.
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The legal arguments for and against impeachment as judicial selection are be-
coming more significant because the risk of the tactic’s successful use has grown.
Impeachment and appointment have become closer alternatives for judicial selection
as legal and political developments erode the barriers to impeachment and build the
barriers to appointment.  The importance of Court membership and the hydraulics of
checks and balances mean that an increasingly difficult process for appointing judges
makes removal on the back end all the more likely.
These developments, however, are not costless.  This Article concluded with a brief
consideration of the costs both for judicial independence and the rule of law.  The
Article suggested avenues for possible reform that, by differentiating the functions,
might avoid the dangerous resort to impeachment as a tool of judicial selection.
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393 The data from 1789 to 1992 is taken from Emily Field Van Tassel, Resignations and
Removals: A History of Federal Judicial Service—and Disservice—1789–1992, 142 U. PA.
L. REV. 333, 408 tbl.1 (1993).
394 See GERHARDT, supra note 47, at 188 n.36 (noting that Judge Collins resigned after
Judicial Conference of United States certified to House that he “engaged in conduct which
might constitute one or more grounds for impeachment”).
395 Id. at 187 n.34 (classifying Judge Fogel’s resignation as part of a deal to avoid
prosecution).
396 155 CONG. REC. S7832 (daily ed. July 22, 2009) (announcing Judge Kent’s resignation
following criminal conviction and House impeachment).
Table 1: In Terrorem Resignations Without Senate Trial393
Judge Year Court
1 William Stephens 1818 D. Ga.
2 Matthias Burnett Tallmadge 1819 D.N.Y.
3 Thomas Irwin 1859 W.D. Pa.
4 Charles Taylor Sherman 1873 N.D. Ohio
5 Richard Busteed 1874 M.D. Ala.
6 Edward Henry Durrell 1874 E.D. La.
7 William Story 1875 W.D. Ark.
8 Peter Stenger Grosscup 1911 7th Cir.
9 Cornelius H. Hanford 1912 W.D. Wash.
10 Daniel Thew Wright 1914 D.D.C.
11 John A. Marshall 1915 D. Utah
12 Kenesaw M. Landis 1922 D.N.J.
13 Francis Asbury Winslow 1929 S.D.N.Y.
14 Joseph Buffington 1938 3d Cir.
15 Edwin Stark Thomas 1939 D. Conn.
16 Martin Thomas Manton 1939 2d Cir.
17 John Warren Davis 1941 3d Cir.
18 Albert Williams Johnson 1945 M.D. Pa.
19 Grover Moscowitz 1947 E.D.N.Y.
20 Abe Fortas 1969 S. Ct.
21 Otto Kerner 1974 7th Cir.
22 Herbert Allen Fogel 1978 E.D. Pa.
23 Robert Frederick Collins394 1993 E.D. La.
24 Robert Peter Aguilar395 1996 N.D. Cal.
25 Samuel B. Kent396 2009 S.D. Tex.
